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At a late stage in preparing this work, we felt - responding to the view of all partners -
that, before analysing the consequences of asset situations for fertility, migration or
environment, we should present, and to some extent explain, some facts about the size,
composition, and distribution of assets for the three countries. This paper presents some
general contextual evidence, and some main results for South Africa. Work is in progress
on the India data, and will be undertaken later for Botswana.2
1. Need and justification for chapter
1.1. Chapter 1 explored theory and evidence that, in developing countries, small-scale farming
(and fairly equally distributed land and other assets) are usually good for efficiency, agricultural
performance, and economic growth. These allocative gains, on top of the distributive effects,
suggest that a government concerned for poverty reduction should induce de-concentration of
large farms (and possibly other rural asset accumulations). But might such  redistributive
'schemes of improvement' have overriding drawbacks?
1 Malthus claimed that one such drawback
to land reforms (and implicitly to other 'schemes of improvement') is that they would increase
population pressure, through higher fertility and perhaps lower rural emigration. This book
explores these claims - and the impact of land and asset size and distribution upon fertility and
migration - in three field surveys of drylands, and assesses environmental implications.
1.2. First, however, this chapter presents our survey evidence (and its context) about rural asset
size and distribution. Sec. 2 sets out our choices on some conceptual and measurement issues.
Sections 3-6 draw on, and seek to interpret, the field realities analysed in the country-specific
chapters 2-4 above. Sec. 3 very briefly recapitulates and contrasts key findings from these
chapters on the rural economies of drylands regions, villages, and farm households in the three
country survey.  Following a glance at the context of national-level evidence (mostly on land
distribution), Section 4 presents  rural asset characteristics - mean size, distribution, and
composition - globally, for these countries, and for survey populations; and links them to
associated, possibly causative, features of (types of) individuals, households or places. The hope
is to establish which sorts, locations or groupings of household are (a) asset-richer, (b) more
unequal, (c) with different proportions of productive and other assets, in these three dryland
areas. Section 6 (to do) summarises the findings and takes up some hints, to be developed in
later chapters, about the nexus between asset size, composition and distribution and demographic
and environmental outcomes. At several points, we place the evidence about asset size, structure
and distribution, in our survey regions, into the context of other national and local evidence.
1.4. The usefulness of this approach is seen from a finding in sec. 4. An average survey holding
of about 2 hectares leaves a household, reliant mainly on it, asset- and income-poor relative to
many or most  neighbours in S Africa - but not so in India. Few  drylands smallholders live
mainly from farming in S Africa and the landed remain relatively poor despite not-too-unequal
local land distribution. In India, most drylands smallholders live mainly from farming, and those
with less, or no, land (in these locally unequal conditions) are relatively poorer still. The policy
relevance is that land redistribution in S Africa, if it is to cut poverty much, has to focus on
measures encouraging land transfer from large commercial holdings (plus some State lands) to
smallholders. On the evidence of the drylands rural asset structures revealed in these surveys,
within currently smallholder areas little poverty reduction can be achieved in S Africa - but more
in India - by land redistribution, or tenurial and legal changes that stimulate it. Botswana is
intermediate between these positions.
1.6. A further concern is to explore how asset size and asset inequality, their correlates, and (if
possible) their origins and causes, are linked to features of the rural economy in the three country
                                                
1These might include high transactions-costs, increased uncertainty, unfairness, or disruption.3
studies. For example can mean landholdings or their inequality be linked to exogenous features
of a village or region, such as aridity, and how might this be explained?
1.7. Why analyse all that in this book? Its scientific concern is the effect of individual and
household land and other asset size and composition, and perhaps also of land and asset
distribution, on fertility, migration, and hence the drylands environment.
2 The policy concern is
the  effect of policies that alter land or asset size or inequality on fertility, migration and
environment. So why review the nature and causes of asset size or inequality? There are four
reasons.
•  First, the nature, type and causes of asset size and inequality may influence its effects.
3  For
example, the same amount of inequality may affect fertility more, if it is mainly between
educated and uneducated (but little as between women and men) than if it is gender
inequality but not educational inequality.  $1000 of land value per person may affect
migration differently from $1000 of non-farm assets per person. Intra-village, inter-village
and interregional inequality may affect water use differently.
•  Second, the effect of any given policy on asset size or distribution may depend on the nature
and causes of initial inequality. The same land reform
4 may have different effects if unequal
control over land is linked to gender, ethnic group, education, or agricultural competence.
•  Third, different land reforms (or other policies) may be appropriate if the aim is to change
male-female, inter-group, inter-village, or intra-village land distribution.
•  Fourth - if (as this book shows) asset size or distribution  is related to demographic or
environmental outcomes - we need to establish which is cause and which is effect.
That is why this chapter gives a brief account of the scale, nature, and where possible causes, of
asset endowment size and inequalities as linked to rural economies.
2. Some conceptual issues: picking types and measures of assets, endowments, inequality
2.1. In this section, to specify our procedures in secs. 3-6, we address some questions:
•  Do we need separate discussions and evidence about asset size and asset inequality? (2.2)
•  What assets should be measured for size and distribution? How do we add them up? (2.3)
•  Do we measure size or distribution per-household, per-person, or per-equivalent-adult? (2.4)
•  What is the set of households, persons or a.e.'s over which we should measure distribution:
the village, the region, the national drylands, or the nation? (2.5)
                                                
2 Suppose behaviour (e.g. fertility) depends only on individual characteristics (e.g. wealth) of the household. Then will
mean behaviour depend only on mean household characteristics? No, for two reasons: (a) the wealth-to-fertility
relation may show nonlinearity; if, for instance, if it is U-shaped, mean fertility will rise with wealth inequality; (b)
there may be interactions among household characteristics (another nonlinearity, in fact). Consider a two-household
economy in which fertility depends on both wealth and education; even if the means of wealth and education are the
same, mean fertility may be affected by whether or not the higher-wealth household is also the higher-education
household. In addition to (a) and (b) there may be cross-household externality, whereby household behaviour depends
on the endowments of others. For instance, given all your endowments and preferences, your capacity to borrow - and
to use the loan to buy extra assets - may depend on whether another villager is rich enough to set up as a lender. These
issues are treated more fully in chapter 1.
3Given a group's mean asset value, asset inequality may affect group outcomes as discussed in fn.2. and ch. 1.
4 Or other measures intentionally or unintentionally affecting land distribution through incentives to transact in
farmland - policies such as progressive land tax, tenancy laws, or subsidies to tractors, irrigation or credit.4
•  Which indicator of inequality is most appropriate for our purposes? (2.6)
 The answers depend on what we should ideally like to do; on what we can infer from household
surveys; and on the scope and shortcomings of our empirical results.
2.2. First, why look at both asset size or endowment (per person, per a.e. or per household) and
asset inequality (e.g. within a region)? As for behaviour, asset size and asset inequality may each
affect it: a person with given assets, in a place with given average assets per person, may behave
differently if a few neighbours are much richer than if they are not (e.g. because credit markets
or job options are different). As for policies, though asset redistribution always affects some
persons' asset size, policies changing total asset value need not affect its distribution..
5 Further,
redistribution at one level may present as pure size changes at another. In South Africa, the main
prospect of redistributing land is from areas where only whites could own land in the apartheid
years, towards nearby areas of tiny smallholdings where blacks were able to own land. If each
inhabitant in recipient regions gains land value and area proportionate to initial holding, then,
within recipient regions, per-person land size rises but distribution is unaffected - it changes at
national level (and perhaps in the donor regions) only.
2.3. What assets should we measure, and how do we add them up? For each drylands region (and
for villages, types of household, etc.) we look at farmland by area and value; livestock-units
6 and
value; value of nonfarm productive assets, housing, and household assets; and total asset value.
Any of these could affect demographic or environmental  behaviour and outcomes, and
(especially if asset markets are imperfect) effects can differ among asset types. Value, of course,
is used to add different asset types, but there are valuation problems for land and cattle in South
Africa and Botswana ( Annex  D.d) We also briefly discuss amount and distribution of
educational assets, but do not add them to other asset types (or discuss their correlates in detail).
That is because valuation, policies for redistribution or distribution-neutral size increase,
7 and
demographic and environmental impacts of education are not comparable to those of other asset
types.
2.4. Should we measure asset size and distribution per-household, per-person or per adult
equivalent (a.e.)? If asset size affects behaviour via an 'intermediate variable' such as current
well-being, risk exposure, or transactions-costs, it is not clear whether it is assets per household,
per person, or per  a.e.  that matter. For example, 'economies of scale in consumption' are
significant and vary among household sizes and structures. Formulae for adult equivalents are
designed to reflect this, suggesting that assets/a.e might be the best measure: however any such
formula is imperfect, so we report key variables per-household and per-a.e (see Annex D.a) and,
where relevant, per-person and per-working-adult data also.
2.5. In what geographical sets of households should we measure/compare asset sizes and
distributions: village, region, national drylands, or the nation? For positive analysis, all are of
interest. For example, cross-village disparities in mean wealth are evidence of underlying
                                                
5 E.g. if reclaimed land is divided among households proportionately to the land they already have; a household may
respond differently to the same extra land if due to non-redistributive reclamation than if due to land redistribution.
6These allow 'adding up' of types of livestock by weighting them by their typical relative worth - important if valua-
tion of some types is difficult. :
7For example, most educational assets are much harder to 'add' to adults than to children.5
heterogeneity across villages that might imply important village effects on individual migration
decisions; the same might apply to heterogeneity across regions. For  policy analysis, the
relevant aggregate - village, region, drylands, nation - depends on the policy (whether for asset
size or distribution) under review. For example, in designing a land reform for a regions within
SA Northern Province (where redistribution would be from non-village lands in White
commercial farms), it would be useful to know (a) the proportion of households that were
landless, (b) whether such households were impoverished - and how uniformly, and (c) how
much these conditions varied within the region. For Rajasthan, where land redistribution would
affect mainly intra-village lands, different data aggregations would be useful.
2.6. Whatever the chosen range, we need to decide which indicator of inequality is most
appropriate for our purposes. We usually use the Gini, because it is clearest, most 'intuitive', and
most widely available in secondary data for comparison with survey results, but the Gini has
drawbacks (unequal weighting of inequality in different parts of the distribution, in some senses
non-decomposability into sources of inequality). So in some cases Theil-T, Theil-L or coefficient
of variation is reported. The issue is discussed in annex D.d.
3. Rural economies in the three drylands
Plan (as per outline): The rural economies: Region and village-group-specific level of living
(very brief), origins of income (production-transfers) and structure of production (especially
crop-animal-nonfarm). Can we distinguish 'types of household' for these, within or across
country studies, regions, groups of households (e.g. female-headed), village types? For example,
do villages fall into groups, some with very much stronger crop sectors, other more animal-
oriented, others largely nonfarm, and a fourth group more centred on remittance incomes - and
can a village's membership of one such group be linked to its ranking in the set of all villages by
asset or land value per person, or by intra-village asset or land inequality?
4. The facts of asset endowments and inequality
SUMMARY
4.1.  The surveys in their context
4.1.1-3: Asset size and distribution evidence is scanty, but  national operational land  Ginis,
widely available, do not systematically mis-estimate regional owned/controlled land distribution.
4.1.4-5: But they confirm (table 1) that countries/regions with large average holdings, and much
grazing land separated from arable land, have higher land Ginis.
4.1.6-7: A bias to non-labour-intensive open grazing is both agro-ecological cause and socio-
political effect of very unequally distributed farmland in southern Africa (as in Latin America).
4.1.8. Ginis allowing for landlessness can be estimated for our surveys, and for some countries.
4.1.9. Survey evidence on dryland Ginis confirms national and regional macro-surveys.
4.2. Assets & links to income, agriculture: the data & hypotheses (so far largely S Africa only)
4.2.1-3: Not much theory exists, but a '3-stage' account of agro-rural development suggests hypo-
theses on asset size, structure, distribution and links to income in developing rural drylands.6
4.2.4. We test against survey results:
(a) I-C poor households have a lower ratio of physical assets to income than the non-poor, so that
values of total physical assets are more unequally distributed than income.
8
(b) For I-C poor households, a low proportion of asset value is 'productive'.
9
(c) A high proportion of productive assets is oriented to farming (farmland, livestock, and other
assets that raise farm output) for most rural households, and especially for the I-C poor.
(d) A high proportion of farm-oriented assets is farmland, at least for the I-C poor.
10
(e) The I-C poor tend to structure productive assets towards high liquidity and divisibility
11 - e.g.
smallstock rather than largestock, especially within poorer rural areas.
(f) Asset positions affect income choices, e.g. landless households receive a relatively high
proportion of migrant contributions in kind.
(g) Farm-related income is a high share of total income, especially for the I-C poor.
4.2.5-12: (a) the S African survey shows that the income-poor are asset-poor, but assets are less
unequal than income. Reasons for this unusual finding, and implications, are reviewed.
(b): in the S African survey, dwellings dominate asset value, specially for the income-poor - but
with important, agriculture-linked regional variation in role and structure of productive assets.
(c): the role of non-farm assets in productive assets is still being explored.
(e), (f): the S African survey confirms these transactions-cost micro-economic hypotheses.
(d): in the S African survey, land is even less important for the non-poor than for the poor; in
West region, the non-poor have a higher ratio of livestock to land in productive assets.
(g) In West region alone, land access is widespread and (especially for factor-reliant households:
#  ), linked to a higher, but still small, role of farm income, and indirectly to higher earnings.
These households show that land and farming, in some areas, and potentially, are more relevant
to rural development and poverty reduction than their low current profile in S Africa suggests.
                                                
8 In developed countries asset/income ratios rise sharply with income (and a fortiori with assets). For developing
countries the probable causes of this (weaker saving and borrowing capacity among the poorer) should apply even
more strongly, but evidence on household non-land asset distribution, especially linked to income data, is scarce
(but see fn. 10 and, for all-India, Pathak [1977]. In Bangladesh, the ratio of land acres per household to mean taka
daily consumption per person in 1998-9 was: for the 13.9% of persons landless (household holding 0-.04 [taken as
.02] acres), .002; for the 31.5% near-landless (.05-.49 [.27]), .020; for the 19.2% marginal (0.5-1.49 [.995]), .068;
for the 11.3% small (1.5-2.49 [1.995]), .090; for the 18.8% medium (2.50-7.49 [4.995]), .275; and for the 5.3% large
(>7.5 [10.0?]), .380. Land-per-household rises much faster than consumption-per-head [Ravallion and Sen 1994:
827]. That would also apply, if a bit less strongly, to land-per-head (household size rises with land per household,
but slowly [Lipton 1985]). In our surveys, land is a falling share of household assets as income-per-person rises (#xx
below); this almost certainly applies to expenditure-per-person too, and to the Bangladesh case. So there - as in our
surveys - asset/income ratios across households almost certainly rise with expenditure-per-person.
9 High birth-rates and infant mortality rates reinforce this, because they mean a high proportion of household
members who consume but do not save.
10 Part of assets (as of labour and income) is linked to the rural non-farm sector (RNFS), producing (a) farm inputs,
(b) value added to farm outputs, (c) consumer goods and services. In poor rural areas, RNFS comprises 25-40% of
income and employment - less of land and animals, more of equipment. The share of (a), (b), and especially (c) rises
with development (as does specialisation within and among households), but depends heavily on growth of nearby
farm demand, especially for the emerging main  RNFS  subsectors, construction, trade and transport [ Reardon
1998…]. The survey lists household and non-farm assets, but they are hard to separate (#xx below).
11 This is normally constrained by an absolute need for a dwelling (see (a) above). However, even here, lower-
income groups are likelier to choose gradually-renewable or disposable dwellings (e.g.  kachcha as against pukka
houses in rural India) and, in developed countries, houses with higher turnover, readily saleable in emergency.7
4.1. The surveys in their context
4.1.1.  Ideally, we should compare the average value and distribution of assets in our three
surveys with similar data for other, relevantly similar regions and countries. Information on total
and specific rural assets is scarce, but we know more about size and distribution of operated rural
farmland  - often the main productive rural asset, and/or the 'key' to household access to others.
Decennial FAO [1997: 6-10] Agricultural Censuses and other sources allow us to compile a
summary rural farmland distribution statistic, the Gini, for 47 developing countries; all but five
also show average holding size (Table 1).
12 To assess and compare such data, note that:
•  Regions of a country with larger farm size tend to have lower land quality and value [for
India, Bhalla and Anand 1988], though within a village or small region there is no such link
[for six semi-arid villages in India see Ryan and Walker 1990: 170];
•  Grazing land is often common or open-access (and hence not part of household
landholdings); access to such land is normally more equal than is private land [see e.g. Jodha
1986];
•  Larger households operate more land [Lipton 1985; Singh 1990: 71; Krishnaji 1987: 893].
4.1.2. For all three reasons, any overall national statistic of inequality of operated farmland area
among households normally overestimates inequality of operated farmland value among persons.
In India, the third factor alone reduced the estimated Gini of owned land from 0.57 to 0.52 in
Palanpur village, Uttar Pradesh, in 1993 [Lanjouw and Stern 1998: 77], but rental options can
raise the effect on operated Ginis (for 252 households a district in Punjab, 0.45 for households,
but 0.23 for persons) [Julka and Sharma 1989: 423-7]). However, reductions in the Gini, as we
move to per-person measures, are less on lower-quality, more uniform land,
13 and much less
where top-end land inequality is very high, as in S Africa;  10-ha farms tend to support smaller
families than 1-ha farms, but the gap between a 10,000-ha and a 10-ha farm will not be reduced
much by family size, especially where huge farms are associated with one ethnic group (Annex
E).Also, while all measures of 'operated household farm area' overstate inequality  among the
landed, the Gini has advantages and drawbacks as a summary distribution statistic [Annex A].
4.1.3. Two issues remain. First - offsetting these tendencies to overstate inequality - land
distribution measures among land operators would rise if they included the landless.
14 From a
Gini among land operators, we can calculate a land Gini among all households, but only if we
know the proportion landless. It can be done for our surveys (see e.g. Table 4), but only for
seven national data sets (Table 2). Second, care is needed when comparing national farmland
inequality indicators (Table 1) with regional (and possibly village) indicators special to drylands,
as in our surveys. Farmland per household within drylands is normally more on average (but of
lower quality and value), and less unequal, than in well watered areas. Table 1 shows national
Ginis for 47 countries; 42 can be listed in descending order of land per person, usually about
1980-81.
                                                
12 (a) These sources often also show holding numbers and areas in standardised size-categories. (b) From these, the
Gini coefficient is estimated as in Annex A. Its values range from 1 (maximum inequality) to 0 (no inequality).
13'Household size...increased more rapidly with the size of operational holdings' in N, E and S India than in W,
because in W India 'the marginal productivity of land tends to fall [less] sharply' [Parthasarathy 1979: 327].
14In an Indian village it raised the 1993 operated land-per-person Gini from .36 to .52 [Lanjouw and Stern 1998: 149].8
TABLE 1. NATIONAL GINIS OF OPERATIONAL FARMLAND AMONG HOLDINGS
Country agp'p/ha.a'ble '80 FmldGini50s       60s                        70s                                80s +       ha/hldg 80s
I Uruguay    0.3                                      .82, .83W (66)            .83                             .84                  234.4
Chile                                                              .93B                                                                                92.4
Paraguay     0.9                                            .93, .87 DO                                            .94                      88.1
Venezuela                                                    .94                         .92                                                       82.0
Brazil          0.5               .83                        .84                         .84                            .86                      70.7
Arg'tina                                                          .84B                    .87W                                                   46.9(70)
Mexico                                                    .75B, DO                   .75                                                       41.4
Cos. Rica    1.2               .79                        .78                         .83 (73)                                               38.3(70)
N'r'gua                                                         .80B                                                                                  37.3(60)
Col'bia        1.6               .85 (54)                 .86                         .86                                                      23.3(90)
Peru                                                             .95W, .93 DO        .78/OCH.91(72)                                 20.1(90)
II Tunisia                                                     .64B                                                                                 15.4(60)
Ecuador                                                       .84DO                                                                               15.3(70)
Panama       1.2              .72 (50)                 .74, .80DO             .78                            .84                     14.7
Honduras    1.3              .73 (52)                                                .78 (71/4?)                                         11.2(90)
Saudi A'bia 4.1                                                                          .79 (72)                    .83 (83)              10.1
Morocco                                                      .64B                                                                                    9.8(60)
Iraq              0.7             .88 (57)                 .73DO                    .57/.65S                   .39 (82)                9.7(70)
Dom.Rep.    1.8             .79                         .80                         .79                                                        9.0(70)
III  G'mala                                                  .83B                        .85S (79)                                             7.8
Algeria                                                                                       .72S (73)                                              6.2(70)
Turkey         0.9                                      .63 (63), .59 DO                                          .58                       6.2
Jordan                                                                                                                          .69 (83)               5.9
Iran                                                              .62W                                                                                   5.2(90)
Pakistan      2.5                            .61SW, .63 (63), .56DO        .52 (73)                    .54                        4.7
El Salvador                                                                                 .61S                                                      4.6(70)
IV Thailand 1.7                                  .46 (63), .43 DO              .41                     .46 (78, S75-6)           3.7
Senegal                                            .40B,  .49 DO                                                                                  3.6(60)
Mali                                                           .48 DO (69)                                                                           3.3
Jamaica                                                       .80                           .80 (69)              .81 (74), .85 (80)       2.9
Ph'pines      3.2             .51 (48)                  .50, .56DO,.58W    .51                      .61S, .53                    2.9
Tanzania                                                      .79 DO                                                                                2.8(90)
Kenya         6.0                                         .82,  .75DO               .80                      .77S                           2.5
Myanmar                                                 .44 DO                                                                                   2.4(90)
Uganda                                                   .48B, .55 DO                                                                           2.2
India           2.7             .68 (54)               .59                          .64, .62 (77/8)          .63; .64 (91-2)        2.0
V Ethiopia                                                                                  .43S (77)                                              1.4
Bangladesh  7.2                                        .47      .57, .47 (77); OCH, DO.42 (76/7) .55/.60S (84)       1.3
M'ascar                                                                                                                        .80 (84)               1.3
Ind'sia         4.1                                    .55B, DO; .62 (63)  .72/S.53/OCH.56(73)                                 1.1
Nepal          5.9                                            .57                         .69/OCH.56              .61 (82)                1.1
Sri Lanka    3.4                                            .66                         .51 (73)                    .62 (82)                 1.1
Korea S       5.8   .72 (45)      .20B,.39S, .30;DO .34,.38 (65)   .31/.37                      .30                        0.99
VI China                          .70 (1930's)                                            .21 (1970's)                .19 (84)
Cuba                                                            .35 (62)                       .28 (73), .21 (78)
Egypt           7.8                .61                      .38/.55DO (65)                                              .43 (84)
Malaysia                                                      .64 DO
Taiwan                                                         .40, .47W
Sources and methods: see Annex B.
 4.1.4. All 42 (of 47) countries in Table 1 that report both mean holding size (normally in the early
1980s) and the Gini of operated holdings (latest available year, typically also in the early 1980s),
fall into five groups, divided by sharp discontinuities of mean holding size:
•  Group 1: in 11 countries, mean holding exceeds 20 ha. They include all 7 S American countries
with known Ginis, and 4 Central-American/Caribbean (CAC) countries. The mean Gini is .86.
•  Group 2: 8 countries, four each in CAC and the Middle-East/N-Africa ( MENA), have mean
holdings between 9.0 ha and 15.4 ha. Their average Gini is .72.
•  Group 3: 7 countries have mean holdings of 4.6-7.8 ha. 4 are in MENA, one is next to it in S
Asia (Pakistan), and two are in CAC. Their average Gini is .66.
•  Group 4: 10 countries have mean holdings of 2.0-3.7 ha. They include 5 of the 7 sub-Saharan
African countries, 3 in E Asia, and one each in S Asia and CAC. Their Ginis average .59.
•  Group 5: 7 countries have mean holdings of 0.9-1.4 ha. Three are in S Asia, and two each in E
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Their mean Gini is .52. If China's mean holding size were known,
it would certainly be in this group, and would cut its members' mean Gini to .48.
4.1.5. The discontinuities in holding size go with Ginis of operated land that rise with average size
of holding, at least across country groups, creating regional patterns. Most countries in South and
Central America, and many in the Middle East and North Africa, contain unusually large areas of
low-quality land, usable only for grazing, often far from small areas of densely settled, often
irrigated, cropland. Such 'grazing-arable separated' (GAS) countries tend to have higher land-area
inequality than others, in two ways. First, even if every country had the same land-value inequality,
'GAS countries' would tend to show higher land-area Ginis: a hectare of good arable land may be
worth as much as fifty hectares of arid grazing. Second, the high costs, risks, and indivisibilities of
acquiring large animals tend to raise mean holding size, relative to arable areas, even further within
the grazing areas, except for much smaller smallstock-oriented farms.
4.1.6. However, such agro-ecology is not the only reason why countries in some regions "connect"
large average holdings with high land inequality: power-structures and socio-economic history also
matter [Binswanger et al. 1995]. Otherwise, how can one explain that in these GAS countries land
inequality is also very high within regions of high-value arable land such as NE Brazil [Thomas
19xx] and the Nile Valley? For example, in Latin America 300-500 years ago, land and people alike
were colonised, and indigenous farmers pushed to tiny holdings of marginal, often hilly, land;
today, owner-operators of giant farms are often descendants of the colonists - and mini-farmers, of
the indigenos. Moreover, the high proportion of land in South America, and much of  MENA and
central America, devoted to land-extensive (and low-employment)  open grazing  - as against
intensive arable - is an effect, not just a cause, of the extreme land inequality in Table 1. Large
farmers, having seized land from family farms, cut labour-related transactions costs by choosing10
less ( labour-)intensive product-mixes, shifting land at the margin from arable to grazing.
15
Smaller, more equal farmers would reverse the shift, saving capital-related transactions costs that
loom larger for them; even GAS countries often have large areas where arable and grazing lands are
nearby, and where there is a choice of use.
4.1.7. This is important for our study. Southern African countries are like Group 1 or Group 2
countries (#4.1.4) in respect of both causes of great land-area inequality. They are GAS countries,
with large dryland grazing areas often quite far from arable land. Also, the pattern of land use and
land inequality is rooted in colonial or racial land expropriation and subsequent inheritance. There
are few data on aggregate land  Ginis in southern Africa, but Annex E provides evidence for S
Africa suggesting high 'Latin American' or Group 1 levels (0.93 in Northern Province).
4.1.8. What can we say about the distribution of operated farmland among the rural population,
landed and landless? If a proportion L of rural households is landless, and the operated and Gini is
G, the rural Gini of land among the landed and landless G* = (L) (1) + (1-L) (G).
TABLE 2. RURAL OPERATED FARMLAND DISTRIBUTION AMONG HOUSEHOLDS
Place, source   Ref. year  G (Gini among landed)  L (proportion landless)  G* (distribution overall)
el-Ghonemy:
Egypt                  1984                .43                                 .24                              .57
Honduras            1974                .78                                 .33                              .85
Jordan                 1983                .69                                 .07                              .71
Kenya                 1981                .77                                 .15                              .80
Pakistan              1980                .54                                 .31                              .68
Annex C:
Bangladesh         1984              .575                                 .25                              .68
India                   1991-2           .64                                   .15                              .69
Rajasthan            1991-2           .61                                  .08                              .64
Annex E:
N Prov S Africa  1993              .93                                     ..                                ..
Our surveys:
Rajasthan          1999                  to be added and written up after data work
N Province, SA* 1999               .35                                   .46                              .64
Botswana           1999                to be added and written up after data work
Sources and notes: First five countries: Table 1; L from [el-Ghonemy 1992: 168-9]. Bangladesh,
India, Rajasthan, Northern Province (overall): see Annex C, E.* African households only.
4.1.9.  How do our survey populations fit into the global evidence of land size and distribution? Our
survey countries and regions show mean land sizes, and Ginis among them, in the normal range in
                                                
15Also, in the macro-economy, higher inequality shifts demand to meat and dairy products - important in agriculture,
where high weight/value ratios (and protection for powerful elites) limit long-distance, especially international, trade.11
drylands areas and countries including them. Due to historically residual  largeholdings, Northern
Province is at the extreme of global land Ginis (akin to the largest in Latin America), and the survey
area contains 'low-end' S African smallholdings only; yet within this area Ginis are much lower, and
farm size averages over 2 hectares of arable per household (Table 5). With the substantial common
grazing land, this could be the basis of substantial farm activity; yet in most of the survey region it
is well below 10 per cent of income. Variation in farm incomes is linked to other options (e.g.
transfer incomes), to sub-regionally different farm resources and distributions, and to policy. In
Rajasthan, land Ginis are far lower than in Northern Province, and smallholder areas have enjoyed a
far higher share of national irrigation and farm research; hence land productivity, and land value for
median farms, is much more than in the S African sample, and so is the role of farming in total
income …. In Botswana ..
4.1.10. There is little comparable evidence on the mean and distribution of assets other than land  in
rural drylands of developing countries, with which to compare the three survey data sets.
4.1.11. [To be inserted.]
4.2. Assets and their links to income and agriculture: some hypotheses and the survey evidence
4.2.1. We now use survey materials from chs. 2-4 to describe household asset size, distribution,
and composition in the three areas in their national contexts and to explore factors associated
with these asset positions . This is preliminary to chs. 5-8 , showing how asset size, distribution
and composition affect fertility, migration, and environment in low-income drylands. It is also
important in itself: we know much less about assets than about income in rural developing areas,
yet asset access is an important determinant of income, security and status. There is not much
economic theory of assets [as opposed to savings and consumption: Nakamura 19xx] for the
producer-consumer rural household.
16
4.2.2. However, standard economics - plus the 'normal' view that most households in poor rural
areas (especially the poor
17) spend most of their working time on farming
18 and get most of their
income from it - does lead, in conjunction with other supposed facts about low-income
agricultures, to hypotheses(underlined in (a)-(g) below) about household physical assets. Not all
these hypotheses can be tested with our data,
19  but several can.
                                                
16 There is of course such theory for banks, focused on optimal balance between profitability, liquidity and safety.
17 Initially we define the 'income poverty' line, for each 1999-2000 country sample, at a round sum (e.g. in S
Africa 2000 Rand per equivalent adult), below which fall some 30 per cent of households. We later show that our
results are (a) not very sensitive to the poverty line, (b) largely valid with a poverty line standardised across
countries at roughly the World Bank's 1993 $1/person/day cutoff (in international purchasing power parity).
18 Two objections: 1. Farming usually has a lower capital/output ratio than rural non-farm goods production - yes,
but (a) less so if animals are included in capital, as they should be; (b) ratio in ag probably lower than in rural
services . 2. Big, growing rural non-farm share : true in some areas and does modify above argument, but less the
case in poorer/remote/drylands areas.]
19 The surveys for this study were developed to explore the  effects of land and asset size, composition and
distribution (on fertility, migration and environment). If our survey resources had been focused on assessing the
causes of household asset size, composition or distribution, they would not have sufficed to meet this main
objective.12
4.2.3. Hypotheses about the size, distribution and relation to income of rural assets and their
composition in cross-section depend on the area's stage of economic, demographic and technical
development. The following sequence [leaning on Boserup 1965 and Ishikawa 1968] is an ideal
type. Remote, undeveloped Stage 1 regions contain elements of Stage 2, even Stage 3. Post-
green-revolutionary, diversified Stage 3 regions retain elements of Stage 2, even Stage 1. How-
ever, the ideal type, while not a stage "theory", has uses in organising our observations and data:
•  A few places, mostly in West or Central Africa, are still in the  initial stage after land
settlement, with land plenty [Boserup 1965]. Land expansion remains a feasible response to
population  growth - or to a change of tastes from leisure to income - without falls in total
factor productivity (TFP), even with no technical progress or educational advance. In such
places land inequality is normally small. Undeveloped land has little value, but land prepared
for cropping embodies scarce labour and forms a large part of household assets. Farming is
the main income source, but the highest incomes normally come from other sources.
•  Most of our survey areas are in an  intermediate stage. Arable land shortage, falling  TFP
from successive increments of developed land plus farm labour, and land-saving technical
progress have appeared alongside rising population [ibid.] or otherwise rising demand. But
diversification into modern non-farm income (and assets) is not yet far advanced. The better-
off still depend mainly on farming, and on land as the key to it. Hence land, livestock and
other farm assets loom large as sources of both asset and income inequality.
•  In the diversification stage, in better-off (including advanced 'green revolution') areas and
visible in some of our survey locations, some wealthy farmers remain, but their wealth
depends increasingly on livestock and (with development) modern,  labour-saving farm
assets. Increasingly, the best-off live mainly on income from employment or non-land assets.
These start to become increasingly significant sources of asset and income inequality, and of
income.
The rural areas surveyed are mostly in the intermediate stage, though some areas (especially in
Rajasthan) have entered the diversification stage and others, especially in Botswana, may be in
the initial stage. Our hypotheses to be tested where possible against the survey results include the
following.
4.2.4. (a) I-C poor households have a lower ratio of physical assets to income than the non-poor,
so that values of total physical assets are more unequally distributed than income.
20
                                                
20 In developed countries asset/income ratios rise sharply with income (and a fortiori with assets). For developing
countries the probable causes of this (weaker saving and borrowing capacity among the poorer) should apply even
more strongly, but evidence on household non-land asset distribution, especially linked to income data, is scarce
(but see fn. 10 and, for all-India, Pathak [1977]. In  Bangladesh, the ratio of land acres per household to mean taka
daily consumption per person in 1998-9 was: for the 13.9% of persons landless (household holding 0-.04 [taken as
.02] acres), .002; for the 31.5% near-landless (.05-.49 [.27]), .020; for the 19.2% marginal (0.5-1.49 [.995]), .068;
for the 11.3% small (1.5-2.49 [1.995]), .090; for the 18.8% medium (2.50-7.49 [4.995]), .275; and for the 5.3% large
(>7.5 [10.0?]), .380. Land-per-household rises much faster than consumption-per-head [Ravallion and Sen 1994:
827]. That would also apply, if a bit less strongly, to land-per-head (household size rises with land per household,
but slowly [Lipton 1985]). In our surveys, land is a falling share of household assets as income-per-person rises (#xx
below); this almost certainly applies to expenditure-per-person too, and to the Bangladesh case. So there - as in our
surveys - asset/income ratios across households almost certainly rise with expenditure-per-person.13
Accumulation of physical assets by the poor through saving and borrowing is limited by the
urgency of current consumption needs (their high time-preference implies lower savings/income
ratios) and the cost and difficulty of borrowing. Accumulation through inheritance is limited by
the fact that the parents of the poor tend to have faced the same difficulties. This hypothesis will
also be explored for main asset types (land, livestock, dwellings).
21  A possible modification is
that where agriculture offers few prospects – either because the area is still in the initial stage, or
because farm resources have been depleted or colonised (see below) local enterprise, not only
farming, is unlikely to thrive. In such cases, higher-income households may prefer to accumulate
education, or other resources that enable them to migrate, rather than low-value physical assets
locally.
(b) For I-C poor households, a low proportion of physical asset value is 'productive'.
22
Small saving and borrowing capacity is concentrated on dwelling needs.
23 It may also be the case
that, apart from household effects, poorer regions are especially unpromising for physical asset
formation, yielding a region effect on the share of productive assets in wealth; in regions in the
initial stage, or from which land and agricultural assets have been substantially alienated,
households able to borrow or save might choose to acquire education for migration, or durable
consumer-goods, rather than local productive assets with low returns.
(c) A high proportion of productive assets is oriented to farming (farmland, livestock, and other
assets that raise farm output) for most rural households, and especially for the I-C poor.
While, notwithstanding this, one would normally expect to find mean landholding (and the
proportion landed) increasing with income, there is evidence that the reverse occurs in some less-
developed African  drylands, so that the landed are on average worse off than the landless.
Substantial agricultural activity (and even farm assets) may characterise mainly income-poorer
households [Delgado, Reardon on Burkina, N Nigeria]. This is usually 'distress diversification'
marking overall rural economic failure, not development transition marking success. Given
stagnant or falling farm output per head and per hectare in much of Africa in 1965-90 [Timmer
1995], the few rural households to escape poverty must do so mainly through non-farm
opportunities. However, because these depend for growth mainly on rising demand from
agriculture, its sluggishness means they grow slowly, often more slowly than population.
24
                                                
21 In three Indian drylands villages in 1975/6-1983-4, wealth-per-person Ginis were 15-40% above income-per-
person Ginis [Walker and Ryan 1990: 73]. In Palanpur,  Uttar Pradesh, per-person real-income and assets Ginis,
respectively, were: 1962-3, .39 (.46); 1983-4, .31(.47). Corresponding Ginis for operated land per person including
(excluding) the landless were: 1962-3, .45 (.37); 1983-4, .51 (.37)  [Lanjouw and Stern 1998: 149, 157, 162].
22 High birth-rates and infant mortality rates reinforce this, because they mean a high proportion of household
members who consume but do not save.
23 Especially to the extent that the market in rented housing is thin or absent.
24 South Africa's farm income trajectory has been more favourable in 1965-95 than in most other parts of Africa
[e.g. Timmer 1995]. That is in part because S Africa's rural success has been based on forced transfers and subsidies
of land, water and inputs to favour a small minority of wealthy, capital-intensive farms, alongside neglect of - or, at
times, heavy extraction from and restrictions upon - the rural majority so there is simply not enough land, water, or
information to support much farming in the sample area; and partly because this area has survived through
remittance and pension income, rather than developed either through farm enrichment or through non-farm
diversification.14
(d) A high proportion of farm-oriented assets is farmland, at least for the I-C poor.
25
Productive land can often be accumulated without formal borrowing, or saving (at the cost of the
poor's already scanty consumption). There are four reasons. First, farmland often yields some
livelihood even with few other farm assets (livestock, tools etc); the reverse less often applies.
Second, unlike other farm assets, area does not depreciate. Third, slack-season  labour is more
readily employed to raise or maintain value of owned farmland (or sometimes to break new
land)
26 than to earn means to acquire other farm assets. Fourth, all these reasons make land the
most plausible producer asset to be bequeathed across poor generations.
(e) The I-C poor tend to structure productive assets towards high liquidity and divisibility
27 - e.g.
smallstock rather than largestock - to allow gradual acquisition without infeasibly large saving or
loans, and gradual sales in case of uninsured emergency need. This will apply especially to poor
rural areas, where capital markets are particularly imperfect, and in such areas may not be
confined to the poor.
(f) Landless households receive a relatively high proportion of migrant contributions in kind, e.g.
as food. Asset positions affect income choices – it is easier for landed households to grow their
own food.
(g) Farm-related income is a high share of total income, especially for the I-C poor.
Asset positions affect income totals. If (c) and (d) apply,  farm-linked assets, especially land, are
a large share of rural assets, especially of productive assets for the poor. For them, however, the
value of such assets – and hence their contribution to income – may be small, either because of
inadequate or bad land overall, or because it is very unequally shared. But will not such
inequality create big farmers, who employ labour, thereby boosting the asset-poor's farm-related
income? Perhaps, but (i) big farmers are less labour-intensive than smaller farms, pushing down
the demand curve for farm labour;
28 and the poor's lack of farmland (ii) raises their need for
employment income and (iii) lowers their opportunity-costs when supplying  labour for hire,
raising their supply curve of labour. Hence great farm inequality pincers the wage down, raising
per-hectare  labour supply while reducing per-hectare demand.
29 Further, very large farmers
spend little of their production and (especially) consumption budget locally [ Hazell and
                                                
25 Part of assets (as of labour and income) is linked to the rural non-farm sector (RNFS), producing (a) farm inputs,
(b) value added to farm outputs, (c) consumer goods and services. In poor rural areas, RNFS comprises 25-40% of
income and employment - less of land and animals, more of equipment. The share of (a), (b), and especially (c) rises
with development (as does specialisation within and among households), but depends heavily on growth of nearby
farm demand, especially for the emerging main  RNFS  subsectors, construction, trade and transport [ Reardon
1998…]. The survey lists household and non-farm assets, but they are hard to separate (#xx below).
26 On 'labouresque' capital see Sen [1968].
27 This is normally constrained by an absolute need for a dwelling (see (a) above). However, even here, lower-
income groups are likelier to choose gradually-renewable or disposable dwellings (e.g.  kachcha as against pukka
houses in rural India) and, in developed countries, houses with higher turnover, readily saleable in emergency.
28 The larger a farm, the likelier it is to gain, via lower transactions-costs, from product-mixes and methods that cut
labour/land and labour/capital ratios.
29 The use by colonial countries of poll-tax or cattle-tax to 'force out' small farmers into the  labour market may
therefore have been supported by the land seizures, also reducing the alternatives open to suppliers of labour.15
Ramasamy 1992]. Often, as in much of the S African survey area, large farmers are far away,
which cuts demand for both local  farmworkers and local non-farm products. This may leave
rural regions, if at the 'wrong end' of inequality in land (and stock and other farm assets) - and,
even more,  poor households within them - unable to subsist mainly on local income, whether
from farm assets or from employment. Whether farm incomes are a 'large' share of total income -
for the region or for the poor, and both absolutely and relatively to others - will depend on local
farm vis-a-vis non-farm growth (following the three 'stages' of #4.2.3), and on rural household
chances to 'depend' on urban remittances or transfers. Such variations in the proportion of rural
people with farm assets, associated with variations in farm income, earnings and poverty, stand
out starkly from regional contrasts in the surveys.
30 Some regions - whether due to lack of farm
opportunity ('natural' or because the whole region has been deprived of farmland or resources) or
to within-area inequality - provide most households with little farmland and hence rural income:
from farming, farm employment (because large farms are less labour-intensive), and secondary
income (because larger farmers have lower propensities to consume locally). This increases rural
dependency on transfer incomes,
31 but the impact on different types of income (migrant and
pension income), and on poor vis-a-vis non-poor, is regionally variable, as we shall explain
4.2.5. We set these seven hypotheses against our SA survey results in #4.3.3-10 below. First, we
ask how they relate to the rural 'sequence' of asset acquisition across the stages described in para
2, and to an overriding feature of farming in drylands: risk. As for sequence, the first asset for
poor households is a dwelling. While they have few other assets, they must normally rely on
others for employment (except in the very few areas where land is still freely available for
development into farmland, private or common). Later, with development (and savings
capacity), even poor rural households often attain some rights to farmland. These are often
followed by command over livestock
32 and/or other farm assets. All this farm capital initially
grows - in value, share of physical assets, even share of productive assets - with development
and poverty reduction.
33 Later, at first for the less poor, land (and even total farm-related capital),
as a share of assets and as a source of income, is displaced by non-farm physical assets,
education, and - unless extreme land inequality restrains demand for labour (#4.2.4g) - non-farm
and more 'modern' employment income. (Thus earnings, rather than assets, are the main income
sources for the rural poor in much of India, and the generally far from poor rural populations of
Western Europe.) Summarising, in early rural development - until almost all workers have
sufficient food, and have begun to rely for total consumption substantially on non-local
production - growth in farm output per head is associated with:
34
                                                
30 As implied by Malthus, if rural area A - because of fewer farm prospects, more inequality, or otherwise - started
with more poverty than B, faster emigration or slower natural increase in A might equalise income levels with B.
Chs. X-xx explore this effect, but it is not instantaneous, and turns out to be dubious even in the long term.
31 Often this is the counterpart of the 'forcing out' of people - from areas deprived of smallholding land by colonial-
type seizure - to work in mines, towns, or large farms, providing remittance (or ultimately pension) income for their
smallholder households, now deprived of land. Cf. the 'marriage of maize and gold' in S Africa in the 1920s, or the
sequences described in Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) by Arrighi [ML ref] and Saul [ML ref ].
32 Our surveys confirm, however, that even the very poor acquire some smallstock quite early in development.
33  This time-sequence, in which early agricultural development leads to a rise  in the share of asset value
comprising land and farm assets, is in contrast to the cross-section hypothesis (c) above.
34 This slides over the differences between staples farming, food (including animal) farming, and farming for own or
nearby consumption. Only in early development in poor rural areas is this elision reasonable [IFAD 2001].16
-- an initial rise in the ratio, to total and productive physical assets, of farm assets - and
sometimes (e.g. via rising land value, and till saving-and-investment 'catch up') even of land;
-- except in very unequal areas increasing disconnection of income poverty from lack of physical
assets, because even those without them benefit from rising demand for  labour [ Kerr and
Kohlavalli 1999, Hazell 1999];
-- and a rise in the proportion of the poor's asset value that is 'productive'.
In later development, there is both capital-intensification in, and product and  labour
diversification  out of, agriculture; the ratios of land to farm assets, and farm assets to total
productive assets, fall sharply; low-income groups shift from reliance on assets to earnings.
4.2.6. Turning to risk, in rural drylands especially, behaviour is modified by the need, especially
in poor households, to take precautions against  covariate, uninsurable and substantial risks
associated with drought. Especially if there is little irrigation (as in our survey areas in Botswana
and S Africa), this pushes poor households away from some activities, especially those incurring
input or hired-labour costs
35 before there is assurance of timely and sufficient rainfall; and thus
towards low-input, low-value crops such as sorghum, and in drier areas away from crops towards
smallstock farming. Our surveys were not designed to explore such issues, but the result is to
modify, not to reverse, behaviour underlying the argument of paras. 4.2.3-5. In particular, in all
three survey areas, while several years of drought or bad rains were reported, so was significant
landholding, cropping, and farm income for many households.
[4.2.7. Tentative. (c), (d) and (g) roughly match evidence from two of the Indian survey districts
(#xx). But in much of India, including these  dryland but significantly irrigated areas of
Rajasthan, smallholder productivity has grown rapidly in the past three decades. Hence (c), (d)
and (g), while still largely true of the Indian sample, have begun to erode. This has gone furthest
in Nagaur district, due to its successful diversification out of agriculture into quarrying. That is a
small example of the 'development transition' that is the usual result of rapidly rising land and
labour productivity in agriculture. In India this is seen mainly in  green-revolution, still
agriculture-based, districts with which Nagaur can exchange, so that initial agricultural surplus
generation becomes, in the formerly backward rural sector, embodied in widespread economic
growth.]
4.3. Farmland, assets, agriculture: why South African survey data refute some 'asset expectations'
4.3.1. The hypotheses in #4.2.4 (underlined below) accord only partly with our S African data.
                                                
35 There was almost no hired labour market to local smallholders in Botswana or S Africa survey villages (check).17
Table 3. Some key asset and income features of SA rural households
All Central South West
All Poor Nonpoor All Poor Nonpoor All Poor Nonpoor All Poor Nonpoor
Obs. 513 163 350 128 51 77 244 75 169 141 37 104
Hhmeans
Income(R) 19504 6272 25933 13401 6623 17587 19900 5981 26716 26784 7978 32345
%shares
Earnings 39.1 29.7 40.2 41.9 17.2 47.6 37.1 31.9 37.7 46.1 41.9 46.4
Pensions 17.8 42.8 14.8 31.4 51.8 26.7 16.5 44.1 13.5 12.9 13.9 12.8
Farm 4.3 7.6 3.9 2.6 3.0 2.6 2.8 8.7 2.1 12.8 11.0 12.9
Migrt 38.8 19.9 41.1 24.1 28.1 23.2 43.6 15.3 46.7 28.2 33.3 27.9
Wealth(R) 53902 41738 59811 72372 66799 75815 45061 39360 50177 80126 34614 92180
%shares
land 4.6 6.9 3.8 3.2 5.4 2.0 5.4 7.7 4.6 3.9 7.2 3.4
livstk 14.4 6.1 17.2 2.8 2.6 3.0 14.8 8.3 17.0 29.3 4.3 32.5
dwllgs 63.8 76.2 59.6 78.5 85.5 74.7 52.5 71.1 59.6 47.4 75.3 43.8
hhassts 13.8 10.6 14.8 14.7 6.5 19.2 14.1 12.7 14.6 11.2 13.1 11.0
fmassts 3.4 0.1 4.6 0.7 0.0 1.1 3.2 0.1 4.2 8.2 0.1 9.2
Assets/inc 2.7 6.6 2.3 5.4 10.1 4.3 2.3 6.6 1.9 3.0 4.3 2.818
%recvrs
earngs 0.46 0.36 0.51 0.41 0.25 0.51 0.43 0.35 0.47 0.73 0.70 0.73
pensions 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.52 0.55 0.51 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.45 0.22 0.53
farm 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.89 0.89 0.89
migrt 0.45 0.25 0.54 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.20 0.55 0.61 0.38 0.68
%owners
land 0.57 0.63 0.54 0.56 0.64 0.51 0.52 0.60 0.48 0.91 0.90 0.91
Notes to table 3
 Source: Kirsten et al, this volume, and their SA country sample data (dec17a.doc, dec18.doc, dec20.doc). For standard errors and further
data, see tables 5-6?? below.
Notes: I-C (income-consumption) poor: households with income below 2000 Rand/year/equiv-alent adult (see Annex D.a.) Ratios of totals,
i.e. row x divided by row y.
Farm income = agricultural sales + self-consumed (subsistence) cereal output (Annex D.c).
Migrant income: remittances + goods brought back by returning migrants.
'Wtd rcvrs' and 'wtd owners': no. of households receiving income (owning assets) of that type; households from villages with smaller
sample/population ratios weighted upwards (Annex D.b).
For standard errors and more detail, see Tables 6 and 7.19
(a) I-C poor households have fewer assets, but a lower ratio of physical assets to income, than
the non-poor, so that values of total physical assets are more unequally distributed than income
I-C poor households unsurprisingly have fewer physical assets than others, but their asset/income
ratio (Table 3, last row) is much higher, about triple that of the non-poor, reflecting the fact that
sample assets, and some main types, are substantially less unequal than income (Kirsten et al.,
this volume, p. xx). This surprising finding reflects the nature of the sample and of S African
distributional history. White farmers, frequently allocated formerly Black-farmed land by fiat in
the apartheid era, are outside the sample and their entitlements to land, water, and other rural
resources make them extremely asset-rich (much more, relatively, than income-rich) compared
to sample members. Were these farmers included, hypothesis (a) would probably pass. Annex E
(to do) estimates the Gini for arable and grazing land in Northern Province (attributing the latter
among households in smallholder areas) at 0.93 - surpassed, in the 43 developing countries with
records, only by Paraguay and Peru (Table 1). That this helps explain the sample IC-poor's
higher asset-income ratio than the non-poor gets some support from the fact that the ratios are
closest in the 'more-developed' West, the sample region where mean income and asset inequality
are both highest.
4.3.2.  That, however, does not fully resolve the mystery. Though this sample is truncated
(excluding the asset-richest rural group),one would expect the sampled IC-poor, even compared
to others in the sample, to be disproportionately low-saving, low-borrowing, and hence even
more asset-poor; yet asset inequality is less than income inequality. If average assets are few
(because of great asset concentration outside these smallholder drylands - on white rural, and
urban, people) and not very unequal (less so than income), how do the surveyed IC-non-poor
attain their substantial income advantage over the IC-poor? Big and very unequal local earnings
are not the main answer. The average poor household gets 44 per cent of income from  pensions
and 15 per cent from migrancy; for the average non-poor household the proportions are reversed,
respectively 15 per cent and 47 per cent (Table 3). For all households together, mean  migrancy
income is 2.5 times mean pension income; mean migrancy income minus mean pension income
is about 27 per cent of mean total income. The much greater dependency of poor households on
pensions, but of non-poor households on much larger migrancy income, accounts for most of the
gap between them. We return to these issues in the context of the striking separation of almost all
the S African survey households into three discrete groups: those whose income depends
overwhelmingly on pensions, on migrancy, and on local earnings, land and other assets (sec. zz).
4.3.3. Perhaps migrant income brings (i) pressure to build up assets (real or financial) for the
migrants rather than for their original households, and (ii) if it is in goods rather than cash, as
with xx per cent of remittances, transactions costs in investment. This is consistent with the fact
that - though the IC-poor's asset/income ratio is, paradoxically, far above the poor's in Central
and South - the ratios are closer in West, where land, livestock and farm-linked assets per
household, and proportions of income from local sources
36 (farm income in particular), are well
above the other regions (Table 3), though all still much lower than in most non-South-African
                                                
36 See Table 3. Compared to West, both Central and South depend much more heavily on non-local income: Central
on pensions, especially for the poor; South on migrant income, especially for the non-poor. See #(XX) below.20
rural developing areas. We return to this in the context of the special features of migrant-
dependent households (sec. 4.4).
4.3.4. The primacy of dwelling capital (and household assets) in S African smallholder areas -
'non-productive' given the thin or absent market in rented accommodation - is supplemented by
the low value (due to its small amount and unimproved nature) of semi-arid cropland. So, more
than the Indian sample, the S African sample confirms hypothesis (b): For I-C poor households,
a low proportion of physical asset value is 'productive'. Land, livestock and farm assets comprise
only 13 per cent of asset value for the I-C poor, and 26 per cent for the non-poor; respectively, a
further 11 and 15 per cent comprises household assets, some of them productive.
37 However,
once again, a pointer towards the likely consequences of agricultural development comes from
the more 'landed' and agriculturally active West region. There, productive farm assets are a
substantial part of total measured assets for the non-poor (47 per cent) but, again, significantly
less so for the poor (11.5 per cent). The gap is also significant in South region (26 per cent as
against 16 per cent), but in Central region (where over 90 per cent of physical assets comprise
dwellings and mostly non-productive household assets) the gap is not statistically significant.
The high share of dwellings, and the small differentiation between dwellings value for the
income-poor and the income-non-poor, helps explain the apparent paradox of higher
asset/income ratios for poor than for non-poor, especially in Central, where poverty incidence is
much the highest, and where land, stock, and farm assets and income count for least.
38 The
excess of non-poor over poor farm assets per household elsewhere (and at all-sample level) is
due mainly to  largestock and other non-land farm assets; farmland, and except in West
smallstock, go against the trend, forming a significantly larger share in assets among poor
households.
4.3.5. Our samples provide very limited evidence to assess hypothesis (c): a high proportion of
productive assets is oriented to farming (farmland, livestock, and other assets that raise farm
output) for most rural households, and especially for the I-C poor).
4.3.6. Before coming to (d) and (g), we confirm (e) and (f); (e) the I-C poor tend to structure
productive assets towards high liquidity and divisibility, at least to the extent that this is
indicated by a higher ratio of smallstock to largestock than in non-poor households (Table 6): (f)
landless households receive a relatively high proportion of migrant contributions in kind, e.g. as
food: landless households receive 26% of migrant incomes as goods as against 15% for the
landed.
39 In this instance transactions-costs generate a link between asset-type and the preferred
type of income.
4.3.7. Literally interpreted, the S African data only partly support (d): a high proportion of farm-
oriented assets is farmland, at least for the I-C poor. Some 53 per cent of their farm-oriented
assets comprises farmland, more than for the non-poor (15 per cent), but overall the share is only
20 per cent.
40 The difference is sharpest in West, where 62 per cent of the IC-poor's farming
                                                
37All cited differences are significant at 5 per cent unless otherwise stated.
38The almost equally low share of farm income in South - despite having considerably more land, stock and farm
assets per household - suggests exposure to more severe drought in the reference year
39 The difference is significant at 1 per cent. The average landed household receives more remitted cash, and a lower
goods value, from migrants than the average landless household.
40This depends on our (perhaps rather high) assumed land price.21
assets comprise land, as against only 7.5 per cent of the much greater farming assets in non-poor
households and 9 per cent overall. Non-poor households, in this more promising farming region,
have supplemented modest land assets by acquiring livestock, especially largestock (Table 6),
much more than elsewhere, or than the poor have been able to do
4.3.8. As for (g), farm-related income is a high share of total income, especially for the I-C poor,
only 4.3 per cent of sample income is from farming. Does this understate the importance of
farming to the rural economy, especially the poor, or in the apparently more farm-oriented West
region (where it provides 13 per cent of income, and where 90 per cent of households own
farmland)? If so, we expect that households with little farmland, above all the landless, in West
have smaller mean income/a.e. (and greater risk of IC poverty) than those with more; and that
the IC-poor have a greater share of income, especially of productive income, derived from
farming. Nevertheless, due to historically high national land Ginis, even West's larger, better-
shared farmland endowment (Table 5) does not leave enough land to generate even close to the
majority of rural income for all but a few households, partly because  migrancy and pensions
together provide over half the income of 70 per cent of households in Central, 60 per cent in
South, and 50 per cent even in the more 'factor-reliant' West region (see Table 9 and sec. 4.4,
where we explore interacting differences between main household income source, region, and
the role of farm land, assets and income).
4.3.9. Pulling together the regional aspects of the findings, we see that where land is less equal,
with a large proportion of tiny farms, and/or linked with few livestock, landedness tends to go
with more poverty. Central typifies this case and West the converse (see table 5). The data show
that:
(i) Landed households' mean income is not significantly different from landless households' for
the whole sample (R19453 v R19572) or in South (R20560 v R19291), but is 62 per cent higher
(R27731 vs R17146)  in West and 25 per cent lower (R11690 v R15611) in Central, the least
agriculturally active region (as indicated by the shares of income and assets related to farming in
Table 3).
(ii) Poverty incidence is significantly higher in South for landed (38.0%) than landless (27.3%),
as in Central (43.7% and 31.1% respectively), but not West  (22.7% and 24.6%). (i) and (ii)
indicate that, in a smallholder region with somewhat more land and livestock (and a more equal
internal distribution of land), agriculture can help pull people out of poverty.
(iii) The better prospects for mean income and poverty incidence - relative to other regions
and/or to the landless - of landed households in West reflect not only direct effects of farm
incomes, but also their link to earnings. Outside West, landless households have higher earnings:
on average, double those of the average landed household in South, and triple in Central. In
West, the landed have 2.6 times the earnings per household of the landless (R13067, or 48 per
cent of total household income, v R4961, or 29 per cent); the gap, and the difference from
landed/landless earnings ratios elsewhere, is significant at 5 per cent despite the small number of
landless sample households in West. Higher earnings in West probably reflect greater local
demand for labour - due to the greater propensity of smaller, more equal farmers to buy goods
locally [e.g. Hazell and Ramasamy 1992].
41 In West, land (via both agricultural activity, and
                                                
41 But this cannot be the whole story, as it would push up earnings of the landless commensurately with those of the
landed22
perhaps as a contributor to earnings via non-farm production) shows some potential as a path to
higher total incomes and escape from poverty and pension-dependency ( para. xx). Inequality
may not fall: in West poor households have fewer total assets than in South or Central, and the
non-poor more (Table 3): i.e. assets are more unequal. A higher proportion of assets in West, for
both poor and non-poor, is productive, farm-related, and helpful to the poor. Poverty incidence is
lower, and the mean income of the poor higher, than elsewhere; especially in Central, there are
too few or too low-quality farm opportunities for farming to contribute much either to the poor's
income and assets, or to the escape from poverty (Tables 3, 6). This underpins the finding that
(in contrast to West) landedness in Central militates against high mean income and predisposes
to poverty, suggesting unattractive farm opportunities there. Especially since land access appears
necessary (though not sufficient) for accumulating other farm assets, and conducive to acquiring
largestock (#xx) - and in conjunction with the much greater pension-dependence of the poor in
South and Central (see below) - the regional contrast, especially between West and Central,
confirms the linkage of rural dependency to premature de-agriculturisation
42 in most S African
smallholder areas. West partly escapes, via more land, water and stock endowments, and perhaps
higher farm productivity (it is nearest to the more productive, largely White-run farms further
West: see map in S Africa country paper). But even in West, with barely 12 per cent of income
directly from farming - and much more elsewhere - such escape requires more access to land
now locked into giant farms outside the survey villages. The landholdings in Tables 3-5 may not
seem so small, but almost all land is unirrigated. In six Indian dryland villages in 1982, the value
of wetland was about four times that of  dryland; the median landholding in  unirrigated-land
equivalent ranged from 2.5 ha to 5.8 ha, averaging 3.7 ha, for the roughly 70 per cent of landed
households [Walker and Ryan 1990: 13, 160]. This (and only slightly smaller equivalent
holdings in (??) the Indian sample) is worth more, both per landed household and overall, than in
the S African sample, even in West. Even in many drylands, irrigation in India allowed a labour-
intensive green revolution, with big income gains for poor small-holders and labourers [Hazell
1999]. S Africa's concentration of over 80 per cent of land (and irrigation) in 5-7 per cent of big
capital-intensive farms is inconsistent with that trajectory.
4.3.10. The S African data - superficially showing farm land and income, actual or potential, as
minor, overall now, for assets or income
43 - if disaggregated reveal land and farming as crucial,
locally now,  and potentially overall, to these, especially for the poor:
•  Household farmland is a higher proportion of household physical assets (6.9 % for the poor
and 3.8% for the nonpoor: table 3). It is also larger for asset-poor households (13.7% for the
bottom quarter as against 4.1% for the rest). Land is more equal than other productive assets.
More land for households like those in our sample would help the asset-poor and IC-poor
most, unless its distribution became less equal.
•  Correspondingly on the income side, farm income looms larger in  income for IC-poor
households than for others (respectively 7.6 per cent and 3.0 per cent); interestingly, the
reverse is true for the asset-poor (for the bottom quarter in wealth it is 1.9% and for the rest it
is 5.0%). However, where farm  income matters most (West), it is equally important for poor
and non-poor.
•  Land as a share of productive assets is 14.8% for the nonpoor and 52.7% for the IC-poor.
                                                
42 Based on historically mandated expropriation to White largeholders of land, water, research, and infrastructure.
43 This view is found right across the political spectrum, owing to its  various possible policy implications.23
•  Household farmland seems a necessary key to non-livestock farm assets.
44 Not one
household had such assets - nor even general-purpose productive assets such as a van, or
non-farm ones such as a sewing machine - unless it also held farmland.
•  Despite common grazing of  largestock and most smallstock, both are more for the landed,
and correlated with private farm size
45, even given region-linked ecology. This may reflect
complementarities: fodder from crop residues, manure, draught.
•  Only household farmland is measured in the survey, and we have assigned a value to it. Yet
households also have access to  common grazing land. Hence farmland forms a larger
proportion of assets than appears from considering private land alone.
•  Where farm income and land are more, and more widespread (in West), households with
farm involvement have more earnings than others; elsewhere, they have less. Hence  farm
assets can, but need not, ease escape from poverty. How do they relate to rural dependency?
The S African data suggest that land access is unrelated to rural dependency, but that
livestock ownership and agricultural income, at least in West, is.
4. Poverty, income, local dependency, land and agriculture: the S African [and Indian] samples
4.4.1.  Smallholdings normally feature much larger  labour/land ratios than  largeholdings (for
reasons of transactions costs [Binswanger et al. 1995, Lipton 1993]). Therefore, in low-income
areas with rapid growth of rural workforce and increasing constraints on arable land supply, the
extent to which rural development enables rural people to obtain livelihoods locally depends
largely on  the proportion of land that is in smallholdings; the effects of technical progress upon
such land; and, in particular, which of three alternative sets of background conditions applies:
•  Little technical change, but farmland mainly in widely-accessible smallholdings: 'agricultural
involution', as found in Indonesia by  Geertz, with need-driven  labour-intensification: more
work just to maintain, at best, farm output and income per person and poverty levels.
•  Farmland mainly in smallholdings, but agro-technical progress  - induced by rising labour/
land ratios [Boserup 1965, Binswanger & Ruttan 1977] or largely exogenous as in Asia's
'green revolution' [Lipton & Longhurst 1989] - fast enough to raise mass farm incomes and
cut poverty despite falling real farm prices (especially with later rural de-agriculturisation).
•  Extreme farmland inequality overall; agrotechnical progress is induced (and affordable, fin-
ancially and as regards risk and access) mainly for large capital-intensive farms, and thus
biased towards their factor-mixes; the rural poor gain little (though seldom nothing).
We now turn to features of the S African sample - and perhaps of S Africa (and other African
countries with extreme land inequality) more widely - suggesting a fourth path:
•  Extreme land and farm-input inequality  between socially separated, but currently
integrating, rural areas. In the historically advantaged areas, the inhabitants, often colonially
or ethnically privileged, were granted land and other agriculture-linked inputs (at the cost of
workers elsewhere), and show  agrotechnical progress followed by success-driven rural
deagriculturisation - falling agricultural shares in rural output and workforce - and
urbanisation. In the disadvantaged areas, output and workforce show  premature de-
agriculturisation. They enjoy neither agricultural prosperity nor rural diversification (though
                                                
44 Such assets are rarely leased in rural smallholdings areas of S Africa, so reverse causation is unlikely to apply.
45 Across 573 households with asset data, the simple r between land and livestock =.18. Further the simple r between
livestock and other farm assets is .41.24
the less agriculturally disfavoured show some 'involution'), but become increasingly  rural
dependencies, upon transfer incomes (from migrants or pensions) from other areas. Even
after ethnic or colonial bias have ended, great inherited land and other intra-rural inequality -
combined with urban bias against rural households
46 - so deprives the disadvantaged rural
areas of land, water, farm research, and farm-linked nonfarm options [Hazell and Ramasamy
1992] that they must turn to non-local transfer incomes for acceptable livelihoods.
4.4.2. The S African sample shows such 'rural dependency' in the structures of assets, poverty,
and income (see Table 4). Almost 98% of the survey population of households falls into three
sharply distinct groups: 27 per cent dependent very largely on pensions, 32 per cent on migrancy
(table 4), and 38 per cent on local (farm and employment) factor returns.
                                          TABLE 4  RURAL DEPENDENCY
          % of households with over half income from:
                   Pensions    Migrancy   Local factors Other households
                                     (rems+gds)
All                  26.8              32.3         38.5   2.3
Poor               40.5              16.5        42.0   1.5
Non-poor       20.1              40.2         36.9   2.8
Central           44.1             25.2         30.6  0.0
South              24.8             33.6 39.8       1.8
West               11.7             35.6 43.0                9.7
4.4.3. The following conclusions can be drawn from tables 4 and 8-11:
(i) For the 'pension-dependent' (PD) 27 per cent of households - half of them poor - 79 per cent
of income is pensions (for others it is 6.7 per cent). Mean income is half that of non-PD
households - R10827 (R22756) - and per a.e. R 2288 (R.5124). PD households, despite the
massively greater role of pensions, obtain a larger share of income from farming than others (5.6
per cent vs. 4.0 per cent, n.s.); the share of farm income in non-pension income is, respectively,
27 per cent and 4.3 per cent. Yet by region PD is most where farming is least (PD affects 44 per
cent of households in Central) and least where farming counts for most (only 11 per cent of
households in West are PD).
(ii) For the migrancy-dependent (MD) 32 per cent- fewer than 1 in 7 poor - 84 per cent of
income is remitted, or brought back as goods, by migrants, as against 6.6 per cent for non-MD
households. Mean income is almost 50% above that of non-MD households (R25068 as against
R16844), and per a.e. R 5547 (R 3752). Like PDs, MDs get a slightly (n.s.) larger share of
income from farming than others (5.8 per cent as against 4.9 per cent), but the share of farm
income in non-migrancy income is 36.5 per cent for the MD and 6.2 per cent for the non-MD.
MD affects 44 per cent of households in South, but only about a quarter in the other two districts;
South relies less on land assets and farm income than West but more than Central, but stands out
for its much higher land inequality.
                                                
46 Such dependency of rural people upon (often urban) transfer in come is entirely consistent with - indeed, may be
necessitated by - public action to turn the terms of trade, or the balance of public expenditure, education, etc.,
against rural (or farm) activity, e.g. in the context of 'urban bias'.25
(iii) What of those who are not MD nor PD, but live mainly on income from earnings or farm-
linked assets: the 'factor-reliant' (FR) 40 per cent of households? (Only 2.3 per cent is not FR
but not, either, MD or PD.)
47 The FR households comprise 38 per cent of the survey total, about
one-third poor. 93 per cent of their income derives from local factors - employment or farming -
as against 8 per cent for non-FR households. Mean income over the whole survey area is almost
the same as for non-FR households (about R 20,000), though income per a.e. at R4800 is slightly
higher; but we later discuss the large regional variations - FRs are far ahead of others in mean
household and per-a.e. income in the more agricuturally active West region, but not in median
incomes, nor in poverty reduction, suggesting better 'development' than 'poverty' impact.
4.4.4. With over half income from pension or migrant sources, and with each source providing
80 per cent of income for those households - over 60 per cent of all - that are PD or MD,
dependency is clearly a key feature of this sample area, as of much of rural S Africa [Lund and
Ardington 19xx]. But MD and PD households are, in some senses, opposites rather than similars.
Before exploring how this relates to farmland and other rural assets, we need to explore regional
amounts, access and distribution  of these (Table 5).
Table 5. SA Landholding: incidence and distribution by region; wealth Ginis by
region
hhs %landed G-landed G-all Meanland Meanland G-wealth G-wealth
(s.e) (s.e) Landed All hh(se) ae(se)
Total 573 54(3) 0.35(.02) 0.64 2.86(.14) 1.55(.11) 0.49(.02) 0.52(.02)
Cent 155 54(5) 0.51(.06) 0.73 2.65(.36) 1.44(.23) 0.44(.04) 0.50(.06)
South 275 49(4) 0.28(.04) 0.65 3.07(.17) 1.51(.15) 0.49(.02) 0.51(.02)
West 143 90(3) 0.23(.03) 0.31 2.28(.09) 2.06(.15) 0.45(.03) 0.47(.03)
In South and Central, barely half the households have farmland. In West, 90 per cent - both
among poor and among others - do, and land distribution is most equal. It is in West that the
proportion of households in  poverty is lowest: 26 per cent, as against 31 per cent in South and
40 per cent in Central. Also, mean income per poor household in West exceeds South's by 34 per
cent, and Central's by 21 per cent
48 (Table 7). True, even for the average IC-poor household in
West, land is only 7 per cent of physical assets, but households owning land are far likelier
(#4.3-10) to own livestock and other farm assets; with land, these are 12 per cent of assets for the
poor in West, and 45 per cent for the non-poor (Table 3). Direct farm incomes form 11.0  per
cent of household income in West for the poor - as against 8.7 per cent in South and 3.0 per cent
in Central. Also earnings form a much larger proportion of the poor's income in  West (42 per
cent, as against 32 per cent in South and only 17 per cent in the least landed region, Central).
Most sample earnings do not come from employment in local agriculture, but some do. Probably,
                                                
47 MDs, PDs and FRs are three very different types, with few overlaps or near neighbours, and together cover almost
all households. MD and PD households are almost opposites. MDs are better-off than non-MDs, less poverty-prone,
larger, with higher proportions of prime-age adults even among resident members??, and most prevalent in South;
PDs the reverse? Also, reliance on pension income in PD households, and on migrant remittances and goods in the
MDs, is around 80 per cent, distinguishing them sharply from each other and FR households.
48 The advantage of poor households in Western over other regions  in terms of income per equivalent adult is
slightly less (29 per cent and 20 per cent respectively), but still significant at 5 per cent, and substantial.26
higher earnings in areas with more, and more widely spread, land and farming are due mainly to
greater primary (and secondary non-farm [Hazell and  Ramasamy 1992]) hired employment
there.
4.4.5. This brings us to the key and distinct regional roles of the 'three-way split' into types of
main income source, and of households largely reliant on each. In West, only a fifth of poor
households receive pensions, and they support 14 per cent of household income for the poor (and
13 per cent for other households); elsewhere about half the poor households receive pensions,
which comprise 44 per cent of the poor's income (13 per cent of the non-poor's) in South and 52
per cent (27 per cent) in Central. Poverty is clearly associated with pension-dependence; farm
incomes, plus earnings perhaps associated with these, appear to substitute for pensions in the
more agricultural West.
4.4.6. While PD-households overall have lowest mean income and are most poverty-prone, the
reverse is true of MDs, but the regional story is more complex. Where migrancy looms largest in
household total incomes (South), it provides much bigger income shares, for a much larger share
of households, among the non-poor than among the poor. In West, migrancy incomes also enter
a significant larger share of poor than of non-poor households, but form a slightly smaller share
of income; and in Central, the least landed region, migrant incomes are greater among the poor.
4.4.7. A profile of West emerges clearly from tables 8 and 9: a much bigger proportion of
households with land; farm assets, land, and livestock a larger share of assets; higher mean
income; lower poverty incidence and depth; less reliance on pensions-plus-migrants (pensions
being much the main contrast vis-a-vis Central, migrant incomes vis-a-vis South); more reliance
on farm incomes, specially for non-poor. We now ask how the three-way split of S African
survey households into pension-dependent (PD),  migrancy-dependent (MD) and factor-reliant
(FR) households - relates to variation of asset size, structure and distribution, and its link to
incomes, in the S African survey.
i. The three-way split by regions: income-dependence, and relevance to assets:
4.4.8. Before using Tables 8-11 to ask how asset size, structure and distribution relate to this
split, we recapitulate its dramatic features. 98 per cent of households in the region
49 derived more
than half their income from just one of three types of source. 27 per cent were pension-dependent
for more than half their income. 32 per cent were  migrancy-dependent, relying mainly on
remittances sent or goods brought by migrants. 38 per cent were factor-reliant, with incomes
mainly from earnings and farming. Typically these 98 per cent of S African survey households
depend on their main source for much more than half income: 80 per cent in PD-households, 84
per cent in MD-households,
50 and 93 per cent in FR-households.
51 It is well known [Ardington
                                                
49 (i) Regional proportions differ slightly from those of observed households, due to population-weighting (Annex
xxx). (ii) The three-way split among persons differs somewhat from that among households due to inter-group
differences in household size. (iii) Of the 513 households with income data, the 'anomalous' 16, not receiving over
half income from pensions, migrancy or factors alone, are close to average in income and asset size and structure
(first two columns of numbers, table 9).
50A further 10.0% of PD household income is from migrancy, and a further 8.6% of MD household income is from
pensions. So these households use locally applied factors of production for less than one-tenth of their income.27
and Lund] that  migrancy and pensions loom large in black S Africans' rural income. Less
familiar is our finding that in Northern Province most households are sharply 'one thing or the
other', PD or MD or FR (table 9). These are unlike rural households in many countries in not
being 'bricoleurs', cobbling together income from widely diversified sources, and so reducing
risk.
52 Drought, the main source of drylands income risk elsewhere, may here be that only for a
few farming-oriented households - but most face similarly serious risk from job loss by one
migrant, death of one pensioner member, or removal of one main local earnings source. Such
risk to non-diversified incomes may deter tying down savings in specific physical assets,
especially illiquid ones such as largestock or tractors.
4.4.9. Is the approximate 27-32-38 percentage split into PD, MD and FR households, and the
percentage reliance on main income source (respectively 80-84-93), uniform by region?  Tables
tws1-2 show that South (with over two-thirds of all households) is close to the survey-wide
results. West has a significantly larger proportion than Central of FR-households (47 per cent as
against 31 per cent) and MD-households (39% v 25%), leaving a much smaller proportion of
Central households as PD (44 per cent; West 13 per cent) (table 8, row 1). These PD households
in West are the only group showing clearly lower main-source income dependence (64 per
cent).
53 All this could be linked to the more promising farm situation in West than in Central.
Bottom line: 98% of households derive over half income - and on average 80-90% of it -
from just one source-group:  migrancy, pensions, or local factor earnings. These three
groups face distinct choices and prospects (including poverty risks) and there is good
reason to believe this affects their assets.
ii. PD, MD and FR: 'demographically distinct' income-seeking behaviour?
4.4.10. For the whole survey area, Table 8 shows no significant differences between FR, PD and
MD households in mean or variability of number of resident persons (7.2-7.4), adult equivalents
(4.7-5.1), or persons of working age (15-60). If anything, migrancy-dependent and pensioner-
dependent households have more working-age residents than others. This is surprising.
54 In the
year 1999-2000,  by earnings and farming, 3.9 working-age residents produced on average
19,100  Rand in FR-house-holds, yet 4.5 such residents averaged only 1900  Rand in MD-
households, and 4.0 in PD-house-holds only 1200 Rand (tables 8-9). Why should working-age
residents in MD and PD households generate so much less income - in each region, as well as
survey-wide - than their FR counterparts? Why should migrants and pensioners hand income to
relatives of working age who seem to do so little for themselves?
55
                                                                                                                                                
51The median PD household obtained xx % of income from pensions; the median MD household, xxx % from
migrancy; and the median FR household, xxxx % from earnings and farming.
52Levi-Strauss [19xx]. A large majority of MD and PD households report only one pensioner or migrant (x% PD,
xx% MD); so their income sources are highly ' undiversified'. FR household earnings may come from several
sources, but are usually from a single 'job'; and only in West region is farming is a substantial source (17%), and
hence diversifier, of FR income.
53Significantly lower than other Districts at 5 per cent, despite the few (15) PD-households in West.
54Especially since the survey average of residents of working age per household, 4.15, is anyway high by the
standards of most such surveys in developing countries.
55 Of course the definition of PD, based on income shares tends to collect households with low earnings
capacity, but the comparison in para.4.4.12 shows that the point is valid, even when such bias is allowed
for.28
4.4.11. A credible account is possible for MD-households. Survey-wide, these get no less income
from migrancy (R21,100) than do FR-households from local factor-based work (R19,900), and
have slightly more  total income per resident adult-equivalent than FR-households, and
significantly less poverty risk (36 per cent  vs 16 per cent). There may be a division of
responsibilities among working-age members of MD-households involving so-called 'chain
migration' of members in turn; periods of rest or illness; and/or rotated or sequential education,
child-care, or care of the old or ill. All MD-household adults may judge that such arrangements
provided at least as good income and security as the option of being factor-reliant - and all might
thus prefer migrancy, despite residents' low factor income and high unemployment.
4.4.12. Staying an MD-household with low factor income, given the numbers in tables 8-9,
might therefore be an equilibrium outcome for both (migrant) income-receivers and (resident
working-age) income-users. It is harder to construct a rationale for pensioner income-receivers
and resident working-age income-users in an average PD-household. This averages 4.0 persons
of working age. They cannot all be looking after Granny full-time. Why should either pensioners
or working-age residents accept the latter's low local factor income? In households with no
pension income earnings per working age adult are five times as high as in households with
pension income. PD-households' total income per  a.e.  averages below half that of other
households; half are poor; and their average household income from pensions is only R8600 - as
against the R20,000-odd apparently available from migrancy or factor-reliance (to judge by MD-
and FR-households respectively) as a use for the time of working-age persons. Local gossip
sometimes suggests that pensioners are bullied into acquiescence, by younger adults who prefer
low income with much leisure to working either locally or as migrants. We have no evidence for
this low view of either human nature or attitudes to income.
56
4.4.13. Regional perspectives cast further light on demographic and income differences between
the three household types. West has larger mean household size than Central (7.93[.25] v
7.00[.33]), a higher ratio of working-age persons to population (61% v 52%), and more adult
equivalents per household (6.4 v 4.7); all these differences are significant. This is despite West's
above-average proportion of FR-households (which average fewest  a.e.'s and working-age
persons in the survey area overall); below-average proportion of PD-households (which average
most a.e.'s at survey level); and below-average a.e's per household among PDs. So something is
sharply 'pushing up' a.e.'s per household in West in the groups based on economic income - FRs
and MDs. This, and West's lower incidence of PD-households, hints that incentives are stronger
for individuals to remain in, shift into, or to form, households in the more productive categories,
leaving far fewer PD households in West than Central (with South intermediate in these
respects).
4.4.14. We hypothesise that this is linked to the greater economic options associated with West's
wider spread of significant land and livestock ownership. Recall that groups with land also have
significantly more earnings at all-sample level; this, too, fits with West's higher incidence of
                                                
56The 15 PD-households in West, with considerably fewer mean working-age residents (especially relative to FR
and MD households) than in Central and South, generate much more local income compared with other households,
and achieve relatively much more household and per-a.e. income; but the subsample is too small for strong
conclusions.29
landedness, FR, and earnings options. That suggests, too, that disappointed townward migrants,
of working age, may find more to attract them back to households in West than elsewhere: a
little land/livestock-based agricultural income is more widely available, raising both demand for
local nonfarm products and labour, and the local wage of those supplying it.
Bottom line: demographic differences among (region x main-income-source) household
groups are small. So PD and MD households contain about as many working age-adults as
those in FRs. Yet breadwinners in PD households are mainly pensioners, in MDs migrants;
working-age resident adults, unlike their counterparts in FR-households, typically
contribute little income via local factors. One can explain breadwinners' complaisance in
MD-households; it is harder for PDs. All this probably affects asset-related decisions.
iii. An identity to 'account' for productive assets by region and dominant income source:
 4.4.15. We have shown big income-source differences, and modest demographic differences,
between PD, MD and FR households, overall and regionally. Are these differences linked to
different values or types of productive assets? For any group, the following identity sorts out
some ways in which households may have high or low productive assets per adult-equivalent:
        Productive Assets/a.e. = (Inc/hh) x (assets/income) x (productive assets/assets)
                                                            Adult equivalents per household
Mean productive assets per adult equivalent range from R 11,000 for factor-reliant households
in West to R 620 for migrancy-dependent households in Central. To what extent are higher
figures linked to higher household income, a higher propensity to turn income into assets, a
higher share of productive in total assets, or lower adult-equivalents per household? The FR-
households in West stand out, averaging R 11,000 of productive assets per a.e. as against R
2500 survey-wide. (The medians are also in sharp contrast: R 3000 of productive assets per a.e.
for the median FR-W household, R643 for the median for the entire survey). FR-W is strikingly
ahead on most scales in table tws 10-11 - but not on median income per a.e. and productive
share in assets, nor on mean and median ratios of total assets to income.
4.4.16. We now look at the region-wise 'three-way split' for each of the variables in turn. First,
we detail regional and income-type variations in productive assets per a.e. We then examine, in
turn, the 'enabling factors' allowing households of various regions and income-source-types to
build up these assets: income per household; asset/income ratios; their upshot, assets per
household; the proportion of these that is 'productive', and their composition; and finally the
impact of variations in adult-equivalents per household. We conclude by  summarising 'what
matters' in affecting regional and income-source-group productive assets per adult equivalent.
iv. The outcome variable - productive assets per adult equivalent:
4.4.17. The 62 FR-households in West are egregious outliers in average productive assets per
a.e.: 4.4 times the survey mean and 4.1 times more than for the next highest group (PD-S).
57 The
combination of factor-reliance and location in West is required for this. Factor-reliance alone
does not suffice: in South, assets per a.e. in factor-reliant households average about the same as
                                                
57 For the medians the respective ratios are 4.7 and  2.2.30
the regional mean (and in Central substantially less). Location in West alone does not suffice to
boost assets per a.e: a PD- (or MD-) household has fewer productive assets per a.e. in West than
in South. Yet West's FR-households are far ahead of all other groups in productive assets, and
lead on almost all the other scales of income and asset ownership in tables 10-11.
4.4.18. The FR-W outlier apart, six of the nine groups (including all in South) have R1350-
R2700 of productive assets per a.e. This leaves two outliers at the opposite end of the scale,
below R 650:  locally-productive (FR-) and distantly-productive (MD-) households in Central.
These households do not have a specially low level of assets or income; their low productive
assets per adult equivalent correspond to ratios of productive assets to assets and income far
below other groups. This suggests that something about Central discourages productive
households from acquiring local productive assets
58 - just as something about West encourages
FR-households to invest in local production. That 'something' may also be what allows West's
FR-households to raise income far above levels elsewhere - and gives West the highest
proportion of households 'choosing' to be FR. The data are consistent with a view that this
'something', present in West but much less so in Central (and intermediate in South), is a
modicum of widespread access to the chance to farm, and to secondary demand and earnings
linked to that.
4.4.19. This is consistent with the fact that in Central - where landlessness is most widespread -
each of the three income-source groups of households averages fewer productive assets per a.e.
than any such group in West or South (table 10). Households in Central have relatively high
asset/income ratios, but local opportunities are such that they choose dwelling and household
assets, rather than productive ones. This cannot be explained mainly by the much higher
incidence of pension-dependent households in Central (41 per cent as against 11 per cent in West
and 23 per cent in South).
59
Bottom line: something about 'local options', perhaps including or derived from farm
options, makes productive asset accumulation much more attractive or feasible for FR-
households in West, and less so for productive (FR and MD) households in Central.
v.  Income per household:
4.4.20. For all regions together this averages 47 per cent less in PD-households (R 10827)  than
in FR-households (R 20523), but even these fall behind MD-households (R 25068) (table 9).
This shows up in mean income per a.e. - barely above poverty, R 2288, for PD households but R
4770 for FRs and R 5547 for MDs - and in poverty incidence: 49.4 per cent for PDs, 35.6 per
cent for FRs and 16.2 per cent for MDs (tables 8-9).
60 Estimated coefficients of variation of
                                                
58Though some pensioner households appear to hang on to significant farmland: see below,  4.4.34.
59First, Central's PD-households average significantly more productive assets per a.e. than other Central households
(Rs 1400, as against R 620-640). Second, PD-households have significantly more productive assets per a.e. than
non-PD households in South also. Third, though PD-households average fewer working-age members in Central
than elsewhere, the difference is not significant at 5 per cent - and even in Central there are 3.4 persons of working
age who might work with productive assets, if this option were attractive. However, high inequality among PD-
Central households lifts their median productive assets per a.e. relative to other groups.
60 Proportionate differences in median incomes and incomes-per-a.e. are larger still; for example the 'middle'
household among PDs has 45 per cent of the income of its counterpart among MDs, and 46 per cent of the income
per adult equivalent.31
household incomes in (PD/FR/MD) are (0.54/1.73/0.78). This may indicate smaller risk,
certainly so in the case of PD households, greater within-group inequality, or both.
4.4.21. To interpret these data, one must allow for big regional differences. In West, the average
FR household has 70 per cent more income than the average MD-household, in Central
insignificantly  - 11 per cent - more, and in South over 30 per cent less. This is consistent with an
effect of more widespread access to land, livestock and farm assets, in West, of raising both farm
income and earnings for FR-households relative to MD-households (table 9).
4.4.22. As for income composition, our data have limited value in the context of the 'three-way
split', since FR-, PD- and MD-households are each so dominated by their main income
source.
61 Clearly, farming provides only a small part of household income overall. Can farming
nevertheless enable rural households to be factor-reliant at decent income levels - suggesting
that a modicum of land, stock, or farm assets transferred to poor households might greatly raise
income and cut poverty in rural S African drylands? We cannot prove this; but it is consistent
with our data for the most 'agricultural' group, FR-households in West. Even for these, farm
income is only 17.4 per cent of household income. In West, where land and livestock are less
inadequate and more equal than elsewhere, a larger proportion of households is factor-reliant;
and West's FR-households (and a.e.'s) have mean income-per-a.e. over 50 per cent above the
all-sample mean. Despite a wide spread of land - though not of livestock
62,  high  income
inequality within FR-W means high mean income pr a.e. does not translate into high median
income per a.e. (table 10); and poverty incidence is 31.3 per cent, not significantly below the
all-sample mean of 32.7 per cent. This is partly because FR households' high mean income in
West is boosted by a few really large outliers - one household with R 68,000 per a.e. boosts the
FR-W mean by R 1100! - but, despite persistent poverty, a substantial number of households
have taken off, possibly reflected in the fact that the Gini of income per a.e. for FR-West is not
above the overall survey level.
Bottom line: mean incomes per household and per  a.e.  support the story of farming
leading to development in FR-W and retardation in Central, but poverty incidences, while
unfavourable in Central, show FR-W's prosperity is distributed very unevenly.
vi. Asset/income ratios - the capacity and willingness to accumulate household assets:
4.4.23. How might regions or main income sources affect the asset/income ratio? Other things
equal, it presumably rises with:
•  Income per a.e., increasing the capacity to save and to borrow, and reducing the pressure to
dissave and to use loans for consumption;
•  Household 'age', i.e. time since it was formed, during which it has been able to save,
borrow, inherit, and so accumulate assets - likely to rise with age of the household head;
63
•  Attractiveness (rate of return), safety and liquidity of local physical assets (vis-à-vis
acquiring education or bearing initial costs of migration) as a use for saving or borrowing.
                                                
61 The only exception is PD-households in West, which derive 36 per cent of income from non-pension sources.
62 The Gini of livestock in FR-W is 0.74, and among those who own any it is 0.71.
63 In rural S Africa and Botswana, many households have no permanent male head, and many unions are common-
law. Hence 'age of household' and its impact on asset/income ratios are complex issues. See the country chapters.32
A cross-cutting issue is the possible porousness of boundaries between migrants and residents,
households, and perhaps household types, over time. The relative 'landedness' of pensioner
households,  their high asset/income ratios and their low farm incomes (of the six households
with over 8 hectares of land, five are pensioners reporting no, or negligible, farm income) may
mean land formally associated with such households, but worked by relatives who get most
land income.
4.4.24. Income per a.e. in PD-households is R 2287[142], as against R 4770[667] for FRs and
R 5547[475] for MDs (Tables 3, 9). Household 'age', however, is high in PD-households, and
their elderly but usually decision-making heads (having relatively low life-expectancy and high
risk-aversion) presumably also find it less rewarding to accumulate local physical assets. How
do such offsetting factors affect asset/income ratios?
64 Overall, PD-households have much the
largest asset/income ratio: 4.84, as against 2.79 for  FRs and only 1.99 for MD-hhs. This
strikingly reverses the pattern of mean income-per-a.e., respectively R 2288[142], 4770[667]
and 5547[475] (table 9). The greater 'age' of PD-households means they have had longer to
acquire assets, far outweighing the effect of their much lower income per  a.e.
65 The
combination of poverty and asset accumulation in PD households helps to account for the
failure of the SA data to support hypothesis (a). It is plausible, too, that in MD-households the
migrant, who brings in 85% of household income, vetoes its use to build up assets (s)he cannot
remote-control, preferring non-local assets, or consumables that returning migrants can share.
4.4.25. Regional differences in asset/income ratios are instructive. West's FR-households do not
have a specially high asset/income ratio; it is higher for FR-households in Central, even though
FR-Central households' 30 per cent lower income per a.e. leaves them with less 'surplus' for asset
accumulation. FR-W households have significantly more assets and  income than others, but
either do not have more savings and borrowing per unit of income, or are less likely to turn them
into local physical assets. But it does seem to pay such households to adopt high ratios of
productive assets to total assets (p. xx). You can "develop" your household based on local factors
in West; in South or Central, better rely on migrant or pensioner income.
Bottom line: PD-households' asset/income ratios are cut by their greater poverty, but this is
probably outweighed by the effect of their longer period of accumulation - probably mostly
before they became PD, when they had more income per  a.e.  and more 'surplus' for
accumulation.
vii. Income/household x assets/income =  assets/household:
4.4.26. What is striking about assets-per-household is:
(i) the big overall shortfall in South (R45000; R72000 for Central, R 80,000 for West);
(ii) closeness of PD, MD and FR households within each region, with one big exception, viz.
                                                
64We discuss PDs' asset structure later; dwellings and household goods are an insignificantly different share of
total assets for PDs overall (76 per cent as against 78 per cent for all households).
65Incidentally, PDs' much greater poverty incidence, lower mean income, and higher asset/income ratios may help
explain why [ref Kirsten et al paper], in the SA survey, income is distributed more unequally than assets.33
(iii) the 62 factor-reliant households in West have mean assets of R116466[15056]), as against
some R 52116[3847]  for other households in West and about R 52368[2770] for the survey
overall. FR households in West stand out for high income and proportionately high assets, not
for a high asset/income ratio - but are specially likely to turn their assets-per-household into
productive channels. For the whole survey, only 22 per cent of assets are productive (table 9, col.
1); yet, of the R 72,500 'excess' assets of the average Western FR household over other
households in West, about R 63,000 is extra productive assets (table 10). Less than R9000 is
used for more valuable dwellings and household assets, despite far higher mean income per a.e.
(R 6701[1319] as against about Rs 4364(316)).
Bottom line: FR-W stands out for high assets-per-household, mainly due to livestock;
otherwise asset-per-household values are clustered by region, rather than household type.
viii. Productive assets/assets and the composition of productive assets
4.4.27. Three facts stand out from the ranking by 'share of assets productive' in table 11.
(i) West's FR-households are far above any other region/income-source group, with 48 per cent
of assets productive (the survey mean is 22 per cent), but the median household in FR-W is not
'special'in this way: it is the top third or so of households who have accumulated substantial
productive assets (see 4.4.28(i)).
(ii) At the other end are all three groups in Central; only 7 per cent of assets is productive. The
links to low and unequal land endowment have already been suggested.
(iii) Further, in South and Central, PDs, although much poorer in income/a.e than MDs or FRs,
have significantly higher proportions of supposedly productive assets, by virtue of their rather
high landholdings.
4.4.28. Five observations on structure of productive assets (table 9) elucidate these facts.
(i) Livestock comprise one-third to three-quarters of productive assets, depending on region
and main income-source, but are most important for FR-West households, which have 7.5
times more livestock value than the average for all other households. The 'productiveness' of
West's FR assets suggests more accessible and attractive (or less daunting) prospects for
agriculture
66 in West. Much lower mean livestock values reflect worse farm prospects for other
groups; After FR-West’s R 40,500, only the PD group in South (R 11,800) has over R 6500
worth.
(ii) Land - while a big part of productive assets for some groups - is a small component of total
asset value for all. In Central and South, about half the households are landed, and about 40%
farm above 1 ha; for West the proportions are rather above 90% and 80% respectively.
(iii) PD-households have 'surprisingly' much land compared to other groups in all regions.
Central features  landedness among a much higher proportion of its 53 PD-households
                                                
66Alternatively, FR-West households might find it specially unattractive to accumulate dwellings or household
durables. This is implausible, however, especially as this group - with 7.8 persons per household, well above the
survey mean (table tws1) - has more scale economies in consuming the benefits of housing or consumer durables.34
(72.2%[6.8%]) than among the 45 FRs (42.6%[9.7%]) or the 30  MDs (44.9%[10.7%]). The
discrepancy in S and W is similar but much smaller. Overall, the percentage of households with
land is higher among PD-households (65.1[5.3]) than among  FRs (52.4[4.3]) or  MDs
(54.0[5.35]). Where land is most unequal, and least important as an income source, it is most
concentrated in (otherwise much poorer) pensioner households - perhaps an imprint of past
inequalities and present land constraints.
67 Relative to total assets, land value (at inevitably
arbitrary prices) is low, but somewhat higher for PD-households in each region than for others
(table 9). Observations in most land-size categories are too few to allow much disaggregation,
but the view of 'some land with pensioners' is reinforced by the fact that, of 15 observed
landholdings above 6 hectares, 10 are with PD-households.
(iv) Where local productive assets matter - in West and South - farm assets other than livestock
and land are much more important for FR-households than for others. However, farm assets are
tiny in PD-households of all regions.
(v) Farm assets are tiny in PD-households of all regions.
Bottom line: FR-W stands out for high mean productive-asset/total-asset ratios (due
substantially to livestock), and Central for low ratios.  Land is a small part of total assets,
but important for PD-households.
ix. Impact (small) of a.e.-per-household differences. Conclusion: recap what matters and what
doesn't, in affecting ranking of [(PD-MD-FR) x region] by productive assets per a.e. Some
words on within-group variations.
                                                
67 In West, where land is widespread and farm income matters, it is found in significant amounts among
FR-households too. Everywhere, groups with substantial productive assets have ratios of non-land to land
value far above average35
Table 6  WEALTH SIZE & COMPOSITION, POOR AND NONPOOR, TOTAL & REGIONAL
                                 Total sample                       Central                         West                                       South
 Set of hhs        All     Poor Nonpoor   All    Poor   Nonpoor       All     Poor Nonpoor            All           Poor      Nonpoor
 No. of hhs      513       163        350        128      51        77            141      37       104                 244              75           169
Asts/hh(R)   53902   41738   59811      72372 66799  75815         80126 34614 92180             45061       39360         50177
(s.e. assets)  (2485)   (2888)   (2289)     (2309)  (3619)  (1500)     (3097) (2678)  (3172)           (2433)        (4084)      (4453)
% land            4.6       6.9         3.8           3.2    5.4       2.0               3.9     7.2          3.4                5.4             7.7          4.6
                        (.4)      (.9)        (.4)           (.7)  (1.4)      (.6)               (.4)    (.9)          (.4)               (.5)           (1.3)        (.6)
livstk            14.4       6.1        17.2          2.8     2.6      3.0              29.3    4.3         32.5              14.8             8.3        17.0
                      (2.0)     (1.7)      (2.5)          (.9)   (1.0)    (1.2)            (3.5)   (1.2)        (3.7)             (2.9)          (2.6)      (3.7)
small              3.3       3.8         3.2            1.0    1.4       0.8               3.1      2.8        3.1                 4.3              5.2         4.0
                      (.4)      (.8)         (.5)           (.2)    (.4)      (.3)              (.6)      (.9)       (.7)                 (.7)            (1.4)       (.8)
large            11.0       2.3       14.0            1.8    1.2       2.1             26.3     1.5        29.4              10.5              3.1        13.0
                   (1.9 )     (1.2)      (2.4)           (.7)    (.7)     (1.1)           (3.6)    (.7)        (3.8)              (2.9)           (1.9)       (3.6)
dwllgs          63.8     76.2       59.6           78.5  85.5    74.7             47.4    75.3       43.8              52.5           71.1         59.6
                     (2.5)    (3.3)      (2.9)           (3.6) (3.7)    (4.9)            (3.6)    (2.3)      (3.4)             (4.5)           (4.2)        (2.9)
hh asts        13.8      10.6       14.8           14.7   6.5     19.2             11.2    13.1        11.0             14.1           12.7         14.6
                    (1.4)     (3.0)       (1.5)          (3.8)  (3.0)   (5.2)            (1.5)    (2.5)       (1.7)            (1.6)           (4.6)        (1.4)
  
fm asts         3.4         0.1        4.6             0.7     0        1.1                8.2     0.1          9.2                3.2             0.1          4.2
                    (1.1)      (0.0)      (1.4)           (.5)      -       (.8)               (1.8)   (.0)        (1.9)              (1.7)           (.1)         (2.2)
Figures in brackets: s.e's.
Differences in category shares of wealth between poor and non-poor households:
-- For whole sample, all sig at 5% except smallstock and household assets (both n.s.)
-- For Central, land and household assets sig at 5%; dwellings sig at 10%; other diffs n.s.
-- For West, as for whole sample; all signif quasi-t-stats much higher, despite smaller sample.
-- For South  land, largestk and (barely) livestk sig at 5%; dwlgs, fmass at 10% (and 7% I guess)36
Table 7  SIZE, COMPOSITION OF INCOME, POOR & NON-POOR, TOTAL & BY REGION
                                Total                                 Central                               West                             South
Set of hhs        All     Poor       Nonpoor        All    Poor   Nonpoor    All   Poor   Nonpoor      All    Poor   Nonpoor
Inc/hh(R)       19504     6272     25933        13401 6623  17587           26784  7978     32345      19900   5981    26716
(s.e. income)   (1394)    (359)     (1875)        (932) (636)  (1128)         (3036)   (607)     (3771)    (1883)   (458)   (2529)
No. rcvg             513       163        350               128    51        77             141        37          104        244        75        169
mean inc/a.e.   4364     1157      5922           3343  1197   4668            5178  1441      6284          4494   1114      6149
(s.e.)                  (316)       (56)     (422)          (356)   (83)   (491)           (598)    (73)     (744)         (426)     (74)     (569)
%s of inc:
1. Earngs      39.1     29.7        40.2          41.9     17.2   47.6            46.1     41.9       46.4         37.1     31.9      37.7
(s.e.)              (4.5)     (4.3)        (5.0)        (5.2)     (5.4)   (6.0)          (5.5)     (7.3)      (6.0)        (6.1)     (5.9)     (6.7)
 no. rcvg        277       68           209           56        14       42            101        26          75           120       28         92
wtd rcvrs       238!      58          180            53        13       39           103         26          76          106        26         80   
2. Pensions   17.8     42.8        14.8          31.4      51.8   26.7           12.9      13.9      12.8         16.5      44.1     13.5
 (s.e.)             (1.9)     (4.3)        (1.9)        (4.5)     (6.7)   (5.0)          (2.1)      (5.0)     (2.2)         (2.4)     (5.8)    (2.4)
no. rcvg         217        66           151            65       28      37              61          7          54            91         31       60
wtd rcvrs       219!       71          148             66       28      39              64         8           55            98         32       65
3. Farm*        4.3      7.6           3.9           2.6         3.0     2.6           12.8      11.0      12.9            2.8        8.7      2.1
 (s.e.)             (0.5)     (1.4)        (0.5)        (0.1)      (1.2)   (1.0)         (1.3)      (1.6)     (1.3)          (0.4)     (2.0)    (0.4)
no. rcvg          222       70          152             21          8       13            123        33         90             78         29        49
wtd rcvrs        231!      76          156            31          11      19            126        33         93           106?       37        69
4. Migrts** 38.8      19.9        41.1            24.1     28.1   23.2          28.2      33.3      27.9          43.6       15.3     46.7
 (s.e.)             (4.1)     (3.4)        (4.5)           (4.0)   (6.4)   (4.8)         (4.1)     (7.2)     (4.3)          (5.4)      (4.3)    (6.0)
no. rcvg         228        48           180             42        18      24             85        13         72            101         17        84
wtd rcvrs       229        41          189              49        19     30              86        14         71            106         15        93
*: subsistence, plus sales.                **:  goods brought back, plus remittances.
NOTE. 'Poor' means 'below 2000R/adult-equivalent/year income'. 'No. rcvg': actual ( unweighted) numbers in the
sample. 'Wtd rcvrs': Best estimates of numbers of households corresponding to proportions of the sample (i.e. of
513) closest to those in the population. Weighting of each sample household is to correct for the fact that households
in villages with smaller samples (relative to their populations) had a smaller chance of being selected.  Weighted
estimates (unlike unweighted ones in the preceding rows) need not add to row or column totals.37
Table 8. PD, MD, FR HOUSEHOLDS: DEMOGRAPHICS AND LANDEDNESS BY
REGION
WHOLE SAMPLE CENTRAL
All PD MD FR All PD MD FR
Obsvd
hhs
513 124 161 212 128 53 30 45
smpl%hh 25.7% 31.0% 37.0% 17.2% 7.6% 4.3% 5.3%
Psns/hh 7.33(.16) 7.64(.33) 7.16(.25) 7.23(.25) 7.00(.33) 7.34(.56) 7.10(.38) 6.41(.58)
A.e./hh 4.94(.92) 5.15(.19) 4.94(.16) 4.73(.14) 4.75(.19) 4.96(.30) 4.85(,28) 4.37(.34)
Wk-
age/hh
4.15(.11) 4.00(.22) 4.49(.19) 3.90(.15) 3.67(.20) 3.40(.30) 4.27(.41) 3.55(.35)
poor hh 32.7(2.7) 49.4(5.8) 16.2(3,3) 35.6(4.3) 38.1(5.0) 43.2(7.8) 45.610.5 24.8(8.1)
Psns/hh 8.21(.28) 8.49(.44) 8.41(.47) 7.76(.46) 8.37(.58)
A.e./hh 5.42(.16) 5.67(.23) 5.59(.30) 5.03(.26) 5.52(.31)
Wk-
age/hh
4.62(.18) 4.78(28) 5.03(.38) 4.19(.26) 4.30(.34)
npoor hh 67.3(2.7) 50.6(5.8) 83.8(3.3) 64.4(4.3) 61.8(5.0) 56.8(7.8) 54.4(10.5) 75.2(8.1)
Psns/hh 6.90(.18) 6.77(.47) 6.91(.28) 6.93(.27) 6.15(.35)
A.e./hh 4.70(.18) 4.63(.28) 4.82(.18) 4.57(.16) 4.27(.22)
Wk-
age/hh
3.92(.13) 3.24(.28) 4.39(.22) 3.73(.18) 3.27(.25)
%hh
landed
57.2(2.8) 65.1(5.3) 54.0(5.3) 52.4(4.3) 56.2(5.2) 72.2(6.8) 44.910.7 42.6(9.7)
SOUTH WEST
All PD MD FR All PD MD FR
Obsvd
hhs
244 56 80 105 141 15 51 62
smpl%hh 66.7% 16.8% 22.8% 27.1% 9.7% 1.3% 3.8% 4.6%
Psns/hh 7.32(.20) 7.82(.42) 6.91(.32) 7.28(.30) 7.93(.25) 6.62(.67) 8.71(.32) 7.88(.38)
A.e./hh 4.90(.12) 5.27(.25) 4.79(.20) 4.71(.18) 5.4(.14) 4.68(.37) 5.99(.22) 5.29(.30)
Wk-
age/hh
4.16(.14) 4.30(.29) 4.35(.24) 3.83(.19) 4.84(.16) 3.77(.41) 5.60(.26) 4.69(.22)














52.0(3.8) 59.4(7.5) 51.1(6.9) 47.1(5.6) 91.1(2.5) 98.1(1.9) 82.0(5.8) 94.6(2.8)38
TABLE 9. PD, MD, FR HOUSEHOLDS: ASSET AND INCOME MEANS AND S.E'S (000 RAND)
Whole Area Central
All PD MD FR All PD MD FR
Hh inc:  19.5(1.4) 10.8(0.7)  25.1 (2.1)  20.5 (2.9)  13.4 (0.9)  10.2 (0.8)  15.0 (2.3)  16.7 (1.9)
Pensions  3.5(0.3)  8.6(0.5) 2.2 (0.5)  0.8(0.2)  4.2(5.5)  8.5(0.6) 1.4 (0.6) 0.4 (0.2)
Rem  7.6 (0.9)  1.1 (0.3)  21.1 (2.0)  0.6 (0.1)  3.2 (0.6)  0.9 (0.3) 10.5 (1.4)  0.6 (0.4)
Earnings  7.6 (1.2)  0.6 (0.2)  1.3 (0.3)  18.0 (2.9)  5.6 (0.9)  0.4 (0.2)   2.9 (1.3) 15.4 (1.9)
Agricult.  0.8 (0.1)  0.6 (0.1)  0.6 (0.1)   1.1 (0.2)  0.4 (0.1)  0.5 (0.2)  0.2(0.1)   0.2 (0.1)
Inc/ a.e.   4.4 (0.3)   2.3 (0.1)   5.5 (0.5)   4.8 (0.7)   3.3 (0.4)  2.3 (0.2)  3.3 (0.6)  4.8 (0.9)
Assets:  53.9 (3.0)  52.5 (6.1)  50.0 (4.4)  57.3 (5.3)  72.4 (8.7) 62.3 10.7) 82.4(18.7) 78.7(17.7)
Liv estock   7.7 (1.3)  9.0 (3.5)  4.7 (1.5)  8.7 (1.8)  2.1 (0.6)   3.2 (1.2)  1.5 (0.8)  0.9(0.3)
Farm as'ts  1.8(0.6)   .03 (.02)  0.5(0.3)  4.1(1.5)  0.5 (0.4)  nil  1.2(1.2)   0.7 (0.7)
Land value   2.5 (0.2)  3.3 (0.4)  2.1 (0.3)  2.2(0.3)  2.3 (0.4)   3.8 (0.8)  1.1 (0.4)   1.1 (0.4)
medians
inc/ae 3.0 2.0 4.4 3.1 2.5 2.1 2.8 3.4
inc/hh 14.1 9.4 21.2 14.4 12.0 8.2 13.1 15.6
wealth 37.4 40.4 34.7 37.1 54.7 53.1 57.0 54.7
wlth/inc 3.05 3.93 2.09 2.99 4.92 5.13 3.76 4.25
prass/wlth 0.057 0.13 0.021 0.049 0.028 0.066 0.018 0.006
prass/inc 0.20 0.44 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.01
South West
All PD MD FR All PD MD FR
Hh inc:  19.8 (1.9)  10.7 (1.0)  27.9 (2.7) 19.0 (3.8)  26.8 (3.0)  16.7 (1.9)  19.9 (1.9)  34.0 (6.7)
Pensions  3.3 (0.4)  8.5(0.7)  2.4 (0.7)  0.7 (0.2)  3.5 (0.4) 10.7 (0.9)  1.8 (0.4)  1.9 (0.5)
Rem  8.7 (1.3)  1.1 (0.4)  24.2 (0.3)  0.4 ( 0.2) 7.6 (0.7)   2.7 (1.2)  14.7 (1.2)  2.0 (0.5)
Earnings  7.4 (1.6)  0.5 (0.2)  0.8 (0.2) 17.4 (3.8) 12.3 (2.8)  2.4 (1.0)  2.4 (0.8)  24.2 (6.0)
Agricult.  0.6 (0.1)  0.6 (0.2)  0.6 (0.1)   0.5 (0.1) 3.4(0.5)  1.0 (0.3)  0.9 (0.1)   5.9 (1.0)
Inc/ a.e.  4.5 (0.4)  2.2 (0.2)  6.3 (0.6)  4.4 (0.9) 5.2(0.6)   3.8 (0.5)   3.4 (0.3)   6.7 (1.3)
Assets:  45.1 (3.3)  48.9 (8.0)  44.3 (4.7) 43.0 (5.4)  80.1(7.4)  40.4 (5.8)  45.4 (3.8)  116.5(15.1)
Liv estock  6.7(1.6)  11.8(5.1)  5.8(2.0)  4.8(1.6) 23.5(4.4)  6.1(2.2)  4.0(1.5)  40.4(9.4)
Farm as'ts  1.4 (0.8)  .03 (.02)  0.2 (0.2)  3.4 (2.0)  6.6 (1.8) 0.1 (0.1)  2.0 (1.2)   11.8 (3.9)
Land value  2.4 (0.2)  3.0 (0.6)  2.2 (0.4)  2.2 (0.3) 3.1(0.2)  3.3 (0.4)  2.7 (0.3)   3.4 (0.2)
medians
inc/ae 3.1 1.9 5.3 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.0 3.2
inc/hh 14.4 9.4 22.8 14.4 17.4 14.1 17.4 17.6
wealth 30.8 30.0 33.6 28.7 47.9 32.7 39.6 80.5
wlth/inc 2.48 3.71 1.59 2.36 3.23 2.75 2.27 4.41
prass/wlth 0.078 0.24 0.093 0.034 0.17 0.23 0.12 0.22
prass/inc 0.15 0.84 0.12 0.06 0.48 0.41 0.21 1.3639
TABLE 10. Income, asset, productive asset ranks, by region x household lead income - values:
means and medians, per household and per a.e.
Income per a.e. (R 000)           Income/household (R000)       Assets/household (R000)    Prod
assets/h'hold (R000)          Prod assets/a.e. (000)
    Mean     Median Mean Median      Mean    Median     Mean
1. FR W 6.7 1. MD S 5.2 1. FR W 34.0 1 MD S 22.8 1FR W 116.5 1. FR W 80.5 1. FR W 55.7
2. MD S 6.3 2. PD W 3.5 2. MD S 27.9 2. FRW 17.6 2. MD C 82.4 2 MD C 57.0 2. PD S  14.9
3. FR C  4.8 3. FR C  3.4 3. MD W19.9 3 MDW 17.4 3. FR C  78.7 3. FR C 54.7 3. FR S  10.3
4. FR S   4.4 4. FR W 3.2 4. FR   S 19.0 4. FR C  15.6 4. PD C  62.3 4. PD C 53.1 4. PD W  9.5
5. PD W 3.8 5. FR S  3.1 5/6 FR C16.7 5. FR S  14.4 5. PD S  48.9 5 MDW 39.6 5. MD W 8.6
6 MD W 3.4 6. MD W 3.0 5/6PD W16.7 6 PD W 14.1 6 MD W 45.4 6. MD S 33.6 6. MD S  8.2
7. MD C 3.3 7. MD C 2.8 7. MD C 15.0 7 MD C 13.0 7. MD S 44.3 7. PD W 32.7 7. PD C  7.0
8. PD C  2.3 8. PD C  2.1 8 PD S   10.6 8. PD S   9.4 8. FR S   43.0 8. PD S 30.0 8. MD C 3.0
9. PD S  2.2 9. PD C  1.9 9. PD C 10.2 9. PD C   8.2 9. PD W 40.4 9. FR S 28.7 9. FR C 2.8
TABLE 11. Income, asset, productive asset ranks, by region x household lead income - ratios:
means and medians, per household and per a.e.
         Assets/income               Productive assets/assets            Productive assets/income
    Mean      Median    Mean     Median    Mean Median
1. PD C  6.08 1. PD S  5.13 1. FR W .478 1. PD S    .24 1. FR W 1.63 1. FR W 1.36
2.MD C  5.51 2. MD S 3.76 2. PD S  .304 2. PD W  .23 2. PD S  1.39 2. PD S    .84
3. FR C  4.72 3 FR W 4.41 3. FR S   .239 3. FR W  .22 3. PD C    .67 3.PD W    .41
4. PD S  4.59 4. FR S   4.25 4. PD W .235 4. MD W .12 4/5 PD W .57 4. PD C    .27
5. FR W 3.42 5. PD S   3.71 5 MD W .190 5 MD S .093 4/5MD W .57 5 MD C    .22
6 PD W  2.43 6. PD W 2.75 6. MD S .185 6. PD C .066 6. FR S     .54 6. MD W  .21
7 MD W 2.29 7 FR S    2.36 7. PD C . 112 7. FR S .034 7. MD S   .29 7. MD S   .12
8. FR S   2.26 8 MD W 2.27 8. MD C .047 8 MD C .018 8. MD C   .26 8. FR S     .06
9. MD S 1.59 9 MD S 1.59 9. FR C  .035 9. FR C .006 9. FR C    .17 9. FR C    .0140
ANNEX A. GINIS
Calculation from size-group data; pros and cons as a summary distribution statistic (compare T
and L Theils); comparing national, regional, local Ginis (to follow)
ANNEX B. SOURCES AND NOTES TO TABLE 1:
DATE, unless otherwise stated in brackets, is that of the country's  FAO World Census of
Agriculture (WCA) rounds - centred on 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990, and in practice usually
up to two years on either side of this (occasionally more; if so, stated in  brackets).
SOURCES:
Except last  col., data with no capital letter are from M. el-Ghonemy, The Political Economy of
Rural Poverty: the case for land reform, London, Routledge,1990: 30; 168-9, 173, 304, 310; 183,
197 (China), 203 (S Korea), 220 (Iraq), 225 (Cuba), 230 (Egypt). WCA is primary source.
Last column: Report on the 1990 World Census of Agriculture, Statistical Development Series no.
9, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Rome, 1997: Table 1.1. 1980 used when available, else
census dates in  brackets. For many countries this source also gives 1960, 1970 and/or 1990 data.
S: from R. Sobhan, Agrarian reform and Social Transformation, London: Zed Books, 1993: 8-11.
India:  Ginis after 1980 from National Sample Survey; see Sarvekshana, XX, 3 (70
th issue), Jan-
March 1997: 22, 26.
B: from A. Berry and W. Cline, Agrarian Structure And Productivity in Developing Countries,
Johns Hopkins, 1979: 38-9, derived from FAO, 1960 Census of Agriculture.
W: from Berry and Cline: 41-2, from World Bank,  Land Reform: Sector Policy Paper,
Washington,. D.C., 1975.
OCH: from K.  Otsuka, H.  Chuma and Y.  Hayami, 'Land and  labour contracts in agrarian
economies, Journal of Economic Literature, XXX, 4, Dec. 1992: p. 1972, citing FAO 1981, plus
publications by Governments of Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Thailand.
DO: from K. Deininger and P. Olinto, 'Asset distribution, inequality and growth', World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper no. 2375, World Bank Development Research Group: Rural
Development Group, June 2000: 24; many data from the 1960 WCA, except Egypt ('from a book by
Simon Commander') and Myanmar (from the 1993 Report on the Mynanmar Census of Agriculture,
photocopied to DO by Gustavo Gordillo).
Many entries in S, B, W, DO and OCH confirm data in el-Ghonemy and are noted only if they
give conflicting Ginis (>0.02 apart) or years.
Distribution of land among land-operating households except Iraq, and in ownership row Egypt.41
Mexico: ejidos assumed equally divided among ejidatario households.
Landless always excluded.
ANNEX C: Regions and groups, Ginis and holding size, and landlessness (from Table 1)
         Middle East and N Africa: Algeria (.72), Egypt* (.43), Iran (.62), Iraq (.39), Jordan (.69),
Morocco (.64), Saudi Arabia (.83), Tunisia (.64), Turkey (.58) AV .6155
         Sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia (.43), Kenya (.77), Madagascar (.80), Mali (.48), Senegal
((.40+.49)/2), Tanzania* (.79), Uganda ((.48+.55)/2) AV. .6043
        S America: Argentina (.87), Brazil (.86), Chile (.93), Colombia (.86), Costa Rica (.83),
Ecuador (.84), Paraguay (.94), Peru ([.78+.91]/2), Uruguay (.84), Venezuela (.92) AV .8735
        Central America and Caribbean: Cuba* ((.28+.21)/2), Dominican Republic (.79), El Salvador
(.61), Guatemala (.85), Honduras (.78), Jamaica (.85), Mexico (.75), Nicaragua (.80), Panama (.84)
AV .7239
       South Asia: Bangladesh ((.55+.60)/2), India (.64), Nepal (.61), Pakistan (.54), Sri Lanka (.62)
AV .5970
       East and SE Asia: China* .19, Indonesia ((.72+.53+.56)/3), Korea (S) .30, Malaysia* .64,
Myanmar .44, Philippines ((.61+.53)/2), Taiwan ((.40+.47)/2??), Thailand (.46) AV .4548
*: no data on holding size (5 of the 48 countries)
Mean holding size
1. 20 ha. +: 11 countries, all LAC (7 South, 4 central/Carib):                        mean Gini .86
2. 9.7-15.4:  8 countries, 4 central/Carib, 4 mid-E/N Afr:                               mean Gini .72
3. 4.6-7.8:    7 countries: 1 S Asia (Pakistan), else central/Carib or MENA: mean Gini .66
4. 2.0-3.7:   10 countries: 5 sub-S Afr, 3 E As, 1 S As, I Cent. Am/Car:         mean Gini .59
5. 0.9-1.4:     7 countries: 3 S Asia, 2 E Asia, 2 sub-Sah. Africa                       mean Gini .52
LANDLESSNESS: This relates to the construction of Table 2. If a proportion L of
households is  ldless, and the land  Gini is G, the Gini of land among the landed and
landless G* = (L) (1) + (1-L) (G). Usable data for proportions of rural households
without land in 5 countries are cited by el-Ghonemy [1992: 168-9]. For BANGLADESH,
M. Ravallion and B.  Sen, 'Impacts on rural poverty of land-based targeting: further
results for Bangladesh', World Development, 22, 6, June 1994, 823-38, give 13.9% of
rural  population effectively without  owned land (<.016 hectares) in 1988; but the
proportion of households must be more, as landless households are smaller; conversely,
the proportion of operationally landless is always less than the proportion with no owned
land. I. J. Singh, The Great Ascent, Johns Hopkins 1990, p, 75, cites 32% of households
owning no land other than their house lot from the 1977 Land Occupancy Survey of 400
villages; but landless labourers excluding sharecroppers, i.e. operationally landless, were
19.8% of total  persons cultivating (landed plus landless)  in 1967-8. If L = 20% of
households operationally landless in 1984, G (operational land Gini) = (.55+.60)/2 (Table
1), G*=.2 + (.8)(.575) = .66. More plausibly, L = 25% and G* = .68.
For rural INDIA, Sarvekshana XX, 3 (Issue no. 70), Jan-Mar 1997, gives G = .641 in
1991-2 (p. 22). The all-India estimate of rural  households is 116.41 million, and of42
operational holdings 93.45 million (p. 16), so L = (116.41-93.45) / 116.41 = 19.7% and
G* = (.197) + (.803)(.641) = .712. But the above population estimate of L = .197 is very
different from the sample estimate: in the pooled sample there were 29046 operational
holdings and 33289 rural households (pp. 14, 17, 85) so L =  (33289-29046) / 33289 =
12.7%. If we deduct from the 29046 the 656 sample households with below 0.002 ha (p.
85), L rises to 14.7 per cent, and the estimate of G* is (.147) + (.853)(.641) so G* = .694.
ANNEX D. SOME ISSUES OF METHOD
a. Adult-equivalents
b. Sample weighting to allow for different probabilities of household selection
c. Treatment of subsistence income
d. Valuing land
ANNEX E.  Estimating a 0.93 farmland Gini for Northern Province, S Africa
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